| With the free and open online shopping environment,the market share of cold chain has significantly increased,and society’s requirements for cold chain logistics are becoming increasingly high.However,the "last mile" distribution problem of cold chain logistics is prominent,which restricts the development of the entire cold chain logistics.This article studies the impact of the "last mile" distribution multi-agent game on behavioral decisionmaking and the role of influencing factors in the game process,and further explores strategies to improve the operational standards of cold chain enterprises,improve the effectiveness of government supervision,and enhance consumer satisfaction,ultimately promoting the healthy development of the cold chain market.This article first constructs a bipartite evolutionary game model between market regulatory authorities and cold chain enterprises.The simulation results show that operating costs are the main factors affecting the decision-making of cold chain enterprises,while regulatory costs and government image are the main influencing factors for whether market regulatory authorities regulate or not;In the game model of government enterprise,there may be competition issues among cold chain enterprises that have successively entered the market under the supervision of market supervision departments and the strategy of solving cold chain enterprises.Therefore,the concept of "free riding" is introduced to construct a system dynamics model of the game between cold chain enterprises under government department supervision.The simulation results show that in the competition among enterprises that have successively entered the cold chain market,The reward and punishment system of government regulatory departments has a positive and positive effect on whether cold chain enterprises are free riding,and the public opinion attention benefits after free riding behavior is exposed will make cold chain enterprises worry about their corporate image and actively solve delivery problems.At the same time,the relationship between additional profits and losses after cold chain enterprises report free riding behavior is a key factor affecting their reporting or not;Based on the study of the multi subject game between government,enterprises,and enterprises,a tripartite game between government,enterprise,and consumer supervision is constructed under the supervision of market regulatory authorities and consumer supervision.The research results indicate that market regulatory authorities should also pay attention to the relationship between the amount of rewards and punishments,regulatory costs,and superior administrative penalties when adjusting the reward and punishment system,which directly affects the enthusiasm and effectiveness of regulatory authorities in implementing supervision;In addition,the net profit difference before and after standardized operation is the main contradiction that affects the strategic choice of cold chain enterprises,and the relationship between social subsidies,risk costs,reporting related fees,and consumer compensation has an impact on consumer strategic choice.Based on the analysis and research results,the paper proposes specific countermeasures and suggestions for optimizing the "last mile" distribution of cold chain logistics for government departments,cold chain enterprises,and consumers.For market supervision departments,they should improve their supervision system,promote mutual supervision,focus on building flexible subsidy mechanisms,increase supervision frequency,and strengthen punishment efforts;For cold chain enterprises,they should enhance their awareness of social responsibility,fully leverage their economic effects,adjust their organizational structure,and actively guide public opinion;For consumers,they should actively exercise their supervisory power,cooperate with market regulatory authorities to establish a dynamic reward mechanism,play a dual regulatory role,and optimize the regulatory system to promote joint supervision. |
