Evolutionary Game Research On Quality Input In Automobile Supply Chain

The quality and safety of automobiles has become a hot issue of current concern.From the social events such as automobile recalls,information asymmetry between enterprises in the supply chain and possible “free-riding” behaviors,it is necessary to improve the quality of automobiles in the supply chain environment.To be safe,it is necessary for the enterprises in the supply chain to work together.It is necessary for the core enterprises to make effective decisions on quality investment.Each of the actors has quality control and input on the products of their respective links,and on the basis of ensuring the maximization of the interests of the enterprises.Improve the quality of vehicle and auto parts products,improve the performance of the automotive supply chain,and strengthen the operation of the automotive supply chain.Based on the above background,and the existing relevant literature,the analysis of theoretical data,combined with the complexity and reality of the automotive supply chain,this paper uses the dynamic evolution game analysis method to construct the automobile manufacturer and parts in the automotive supply chain.The dynamic evolution model of quality input that the two core entities of the supplier participate in is used to study the evolution mechanism and development direction of the quality investment of the main enterprises in the automobile supply chain.At the same time,based on the evolution area model and the replication dynamic equation of the quality input in the automobile supply chain,the influence of the parameters in the model on the evolution system is analyzed by means of differential derivation.Finally,the system simulation method is used to stabilize the quality input strategy.The evolution and parametric effects were numerically simulated.Studies have shown that when both the automaker and the component supplier have a small input-output ratio,the two parties are more likely to adopt a “negative wait” strategy;when one party has a larger input-output ratio,the other party still relatively small,the larger of the two parties will adopt the "active investment" strategy,while the other party will adopt the "negative waiting" strategy;when one party carries out quality investment and the other party receives a "free rider" gain,if only one of the two parties adopts a “active investment” strategy,the other party will adopt a “negative waiting” strategy;when both parties have a large input-output ratio for quality investment,both parties will adopt “active” in quality investment decisions.Invest in the strategy.In addition,the increase of parameters such as input-output ratio and income increment in the model can encourage enterprises to actively carry out quality investment.It is necessary for enterprises to improve in this aspect.At the same time,the increase of investment cost and “free-riding” income will increase.Obstructing enterprises to make quality investment,enterprises should take measures within reasonable limits to reduce this hindrance.