Research On Pricing Decision And Traceability Cooperation Stability Of Power Battery Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Information Asymmetry

Under the continuing effects of international instability,tight oil supply and climate change,the new energy vehicle industry is growing rapidly.China’s new energy vehicle market penetration rate is increasing year by year,and the scale of power battery decommissioning is expanding,which will cause serious environmental pollution and waste of resources if not properly disposed of.In China,the extended producer responsibility system has been implemented for many years in the decommissioning of power batteries,and new energy vehicle manufacturers assume the main responsibility for new energy vehicle power battery recycling,while encouraging multi-party cooperation to build recycling outlets.However,due to the lack of mandatory regulatory measures in China,the traceability management of vehicle enterprises is ineffective,and their information reporting is not true and incomplete so that the supply and demand market information is increasingly opaque.The outstanding problem of information asymmetry in the supply and demand market leads to chaos in the recycling market and informal recyclers unlawful profits,which has become an important reason to restrict the healthy development of China’s power battery recycling market.Hence,under the extended producer responsibility system,it is set that a new energy vehicle manufacturer has private information about the recyclable market.With the introduction of competition from informal recycling channels,analyzing the impact of information asymmetry in the recycling market on the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries and establishing a mechanism to strengthen the traceability mechanism and recycling cooperation mechanism,in which to promote the traceability and openness of information about the decommissioned power batteries,are of great significance to regulate the power battery recycling market,guarantee the stable development of the new energy vehicle industry and promote national environmental governance.The main research contents of this paper are as follows: first,in a closed-loop supply chain system consisting of a battery producer,a retired power battery comprehensive utilization enterprise,and a new energy vehicle producer,four new energy vehicle producer information sharing behaviors are classified.Based on the consumer utility function,the Stackelberg game is employed to solve the optimal decision of members under each information structure.The members’ pricing,profit and recycling volume are compared cross-sectionally,and the information sharing preferences of members are summarized.Meanwhile,a comprehensive analysis is further conducted in conjunction with informal recycling channel competition.Second,on top of the former,a dual mechanism of recycling cooperative information sharing and enhanced traceability management is added.And the level of traceability management is introduced into the consumer utility function.The construction of a three-party evolutionary game model is carried out,which obtains eight strategy combinations.Through the Stackelberg game,the optimal decision and profit value of the members under each strategy combination are solved.After solving the problem of whether recycling cooperation information sharing mechanism is established,the evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze the evolutionary process of strategy selection behavior of game subjects.Finally,after summarizing the findings of the previous study,countermeasure suggestions for the government and related enterprises are proposed.The main research results of this paper are as follows:(1)When there is no cooperative information sharing mechanism,the new energy vehicle manufacturer will never disclose private recycling market information,whose profit losses cannot be compensated by the information compensation mechanism at the same time.At this point,the formal recycling market will only benefit when the recycling market is favorable,stimulated by competition from informal recycling channels.(2)The introduction of the cooperative information sharing mechanism can solve the problem of the new energy vehicle manufacturer’s reluctance to disclose private information,but only between the new energy vehicle manufacturer and the battery manufacturer.Moreover,the new energy vehicle manufacturer can also get an additional share of recycling network construction costs.(3)Under the cooperative information sharing mechanism,the new energy vehicle manufacturer and comprehensive utilization enterprise will always choose to strengthen traceability management and non-cooperative co-construction of recovery network.As the cost sharing ratio of the battery manufacturer increases or the accuracy of prediction decreases,the choice of the battery manufacturer’s strategy will shift from co-constructing recycling networks to non-cooperation.At this point,stimulated by the informal recycling channel competition,the new energy vehicle manufacturer needs to actively improve the efficiency of traceability management and reduce traceability costs in order to steadily develop the formal recycling market.(4)When the recovery market is improving,although information sharing reduces the recovery price of information symmetry side,reduces the recycling amount of retired power batteries and weakens the traceability management level,the choice of new energy vehicle manufacturers to strengthen the traceability management of retired power batteries is always conducive to the recovery of retired power batteries.(5)The comprehensive utilization enterprise is always at an information disadvantage and its profits will be embezzled,which means that it is possible to open more recycling channels or even take illegal procedures to increase self-benefits.