Research On Government Reward-penalty Mechanism Under Different Recycling Channels For New Energy Vehicle Power Battery

As the social and economic prosperity continues,the scale of China’s automobile consumption market is gradually growing.At the same time,with the increasing awareness of global environmental protection,people are also highly interested in new energy vehicles,and their market demand is also rising rapidly.However,the demand for and disposal of power batteries,an important component of new energy vehicles,is also growing.Due to the high cost of manufacturing new energy vehicle power batteries and the strong pollution of waste,the issue of their recycling and remanufacturing has attracted great attention from governments,enterprises and relevant scholars at home and abroad.The construction of a sound policy system for recycling used power batteries and a recycling responsibility system is conducive to the sustainable development of the economy,society and the environment.Based on the Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR)system,this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model dominated by power battery manufacturers,vehicle manufacturers and third-party recyclers under three different recycling channels to improve the recycling rate of new energy vehicle power batteries,calculates the equilibrium solution of the government’s decision under the implementation of reward and punishment strategies for different participating members of the closed-loop supply chain.The equilibrium solution of the decision is also reconciled on the basis of the recycling rate for the calculated results,and finally the numerical simulation is applied to further validate,and the following conclusions are drawn:First,in the case of recycling by power battery manufacturers,the implementation of government reward and punishment mechanism has a positive effect on the profits of all parties in the supply chain,and the recycling rate of used power batteries is highest when the government alone implements reward and punishment for power battery manufacturers,at which time power battery manufacturers and vehicle manufacturers can improve their own interests by implementing a strategy of selling more at a lower profit.In this case,power battery manufacturers are better suited to share the greater responsibility for recycling.Secondly,in the case of recycling by whole vehicle enterprises,the implementation of the government reward and punishment mechanism has a positive effect on the profits of supply chain members,and when the government alone implements the reward and punishment mechanism for whole vehicle enterprises,the recycling rate of used power batteries is the highest,at this time,whole vehicle enterprises can implement the strategy of selling more at a lower profit to increase the recycling rate and their own profits;when the government alone implements the reward and punishment mechanism for power battery manufacturers,they should adopt a strategy of lowering the wholesale price of power batteries to increase their own profits.In this case,if the vehicle enterprises share more responsibility,other closed-loop supply chain enterprises can gain more revenue from it.Third,in the case of recycling by third-party recyclers,the recycling rate of used power batteries and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain system are both highest when the government alone implements a reward and punishment mechanism for third-party recyclers.When the government alone imposes reward and punishment mechanism for vehicle enterprises,although the vehicle enterprises suffer a loss in profit,the closed-loop supply chain members are free-riding,so the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain is always in a state of growth.In this scenario,third-party recyclers are better suited to a situation where they share more responsibility for recycling.