Research On Government Supervision Strategy Of Urban Greenway Project Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

As a kind of green infrastructure for urban ecology and leisure,greenway can connect the broken green space between regions or cities,form a green network,and protect the ecological security pattern between regions.At the same time,greenways can protect the city’s species diversity and improve the city’s green coverage.Because of the complexity,long-term and public welfare of urban greenway project,the contractor or operator will take speculative action to gain profit during the construction and operation period.Therefore,this thesis focuses on the participants’ behaviors during the construction and operation of urban greenway projects,and analyzes the government’s regulatory strategies under different parameters,with a view to providing suggestions to curb the speculative behavior of cooperative enterprises in the construction and operation of urban greenway projects,so as to promote the better development of urban greenways.In the construction and operation period of the urban greenway project,based on the Evolutionary game theory,this thesis constructs the two-party replication dynamic equation model and the three-party replication dynamic equation model,in which the government and the contractor are the main players and the government,the contractor and the public,the thesis also analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the government and contractors under different public supervision and reward conditions to identify the opportunistic behavior of contractors.At the same time,taking GG Ecological engineering as a case,the simulation path of government evolutionary equilibrium strategy in construction and operation period is analyzed.The conclusions are as follows :（1）The evolutionary game model of government regulation during the construction and operation period of urban greenway project is constructed.During the construction period,the possibility of identifying the contractor’s opportunistic behavior under public supervision θ affects the government’s strategy,and its critical value θ₀=D/（E+F1）;In the operation period,the strategy choice of the government,the operator and the public is affected by the incentive coefficient.（2）Combined with the case,this thesis puts forward the equilibrium path of the government’s supervision strategy for the greenway project under the different participation conditions and degrees of the public,this paper analyzes the influence of the possibility of public supervision on the effect of Supervision and the influence of the incentive coefficient of operation and the degree of public participation on the supervision strategy.During the construction period,when θ₀<θ≤1,the government tends to regulate normally,the contractor tends not to take opportunism,and there exists evolutionary stable strategy（0,1）;During the operation period,the government should choose to actively supervise and increase the public reward strategy to make the operators choose to provide high service quality,that is,to achieve a（1,1,1）evolutionarily stable strategy.And put forward the corresponding sugguestion.According to the simulation and measured data of the Optics Valley Ecological Corridor,it is proposed that the urban greenway project during the construction period can introduce the public as the main participant to discuss the government supervision strategy under the tripartite game during the construction period.During the operation period of the urban greenway project,in addition to considering the strategic impact of the reward performance coefficient on the three-party evolutionary game,the impact of the government’s payment to the operator’s operation and maintenance subsidy ratio on the three-party evolutionary stability strategy of the evolutionary game system can also be considered.