Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Project Quality Supervision Considering Public We Media Approach

With the development of smartphones and the 5G networks,new supervision modes by the approach of We Media are gradually introduced into the field of project management,but the impact and mechanism of the new supervision modes on project quality have not been fully studied.This paper focuses on project quality supervision under the supervision mode of We Media.Considering that project quality supervision have multi-period dynamic attributes and the decision-makers often have bounded rationality,this paper adopts an evolutionary game framework to study this problem.the research is organized as follows: firstly,the traditional mode is studied,secondly the supervision mode of We Media are explored,finally simulation experiments are finished and the conclusions are summarized.There are three core chapters in this paper,and the regarding contents and conclusions are as follows:First,the evolutionary game analysis of engineering quality supervision under the traditional supervision mode.First of all,an evolutionary game framework of project supervision is built between the supervision firm and contractor;Secondly,the payoff matrix of the players is built;Thirdly,the evolution process is analysed,and the equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game is solved;Finally,the stability of the strategy is analyzed,and the optimal regulatory strategy is obtained.This chapter finds that:(1)rent-seeking is not a sufficient condition to cause low-quality construction,and the key factor for high-quality construction is the level of the punishment cost which occurs when the project quality problem is exposed.The rent-seeking decision and high-quality construction decision have a certain causal link.The key impact factor of the rent-seeking behavior of the supervisor is the punishment cost.If the punishment cost for the supervisor is high,the supervisor would choose not to earn rent-seeking when low-quality construction happens.Second,the evolutionary game analysis of project quality supervision under the supervision mold of We Media.First,the relationship between the supervisior,contractor,and We Media is analyzed,and the key variables and the sequence of the game are clarified;Secondly,the payoff matrix of each player under the supervision of We Media is constructed;Thirdly,the evolutionary equilibrium strategy is solved,the evolutionary stability is analyzed,and the mathematical analysis is applied to obtain relevant conclusions.The research in this chapter finds that the key factor affecting the ESS is the difference between the cost of high-quality construction and low-quality construction;The We Media supervision mode will also lead to a bad equilibrium,under which the contractor chooses low-quality construction,the supervisor chooses rent-seeking,and We Media chooses to expose,that is,the mode of We Media supervision may not bring good results;We Media supervision mode plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality construction,but under ESS,We Media supervision have little effect in the rent-seeking behavior of the supervisor.Finally,the simulation analysis of project quality supervision evolutionary game.Firstly,the main conclusions of each core chapter are verified by the numerical simulation by matlab software;Secondly,sensitivity experiments on various types of parameters are conducted to explore more conclusions;Thirdly,the two supervision modes are compared.The research in this chapter finds that the supervision of We Media can improve the game results to a certain extent,providing diversified supervision modes for the project quality supervision,but it must be recognized that the existence of We Media supervision is not a necessary condition for the high-quality construction,under the We Media supervision mode,the construction party ESS may still be low-quality construction;Evolutionary equilibrium may not exist under some circumstances.When the supervision mode of We Media is adopted,the participation of third-party supervision subjects makes the relationship between decision-makers more complex,which makes equilibrium may not exist.