Dynamic Game Analysis Of Stakeholders In Rural Homestead Land Withdrawal

To achieve the goals of rural land expropriation and sustainable use in China,it is essential to deepen the pilot work of the land system.However,conflicting interests among participants in the land expropriation process make it difficult to achieve the desired goals.This article first introduces the background and development of the rural land system in China,identifies the stakeholders involved in the land expropriation process,analyzes the current situation of land expropriation management in China,and summarizes the causes of the difficulties in land expropriation based on domestic research results.Secondly,the article analyzes the different interests of the three main participants in this process,namely the central government,local government,and farmers.The central government hopes to promote intensive land use and coordinated urban-rural development while maintaining social stability.Local governments,on the other hand,need to expand local economic development,gain political achievements,and maintain land finance.Farmers are concerned about protecting their own rights and interests and future livelihoods.Based on the above situation,this article proposes an evolutionary game theory framework and constructs two game models: local government and farmers,and central government and local government.The decision coordination problem under different states is studied,and the mutual influence of the participants is explored.By deducing the evolutionary game model,differential evolutionary paths and stable strategies of the game are obtained,and the equilibrium result of the evolutionary game is theoretically proved.Then,based on the framework of the system dynamics model(SD),the article uses Vensim PLE software to conduct simulation experiments and calculation analysis.By comparing the results under different scenarios and evaluating the impact factors on the system behavior,sustainable solutions are studied.Finally,dynamic reward and punishment strategies are added to the original model to study the evolutionary paths and stable strategies of both parties under dynamic compensation and punishment strategies.This method can better consider the interests and needs of all parties and propose more comprehensive and sustainable solutions.The research results show that interest differences are the main factor restricting effective land expropriation and sustainable use.The evolutionary game theory framework and system dynamics model are effective methods for studying such problems.In this case,adopting dynamic reward and punishment strategies can better balance the interests and needs of all parties.This article proposes some policy suggestions to promote rural land system reform and sustainable development: the government should adopt relatively advanced dynamic reward and punishment strategies to incentivize farmers to exit the land and appropriately punish uncooperative farmers.This can make farmers more active in exiting the land and save time and money for local governments.In addition,the central government should also provide better promotion opportunities for local government officials who perform well.