Game Analysis And Simulation Research Of Shared Bike Stakeholders

Bike-sharing is a major innovation in the current transportation and travel field.Its flexible features not only refine the city’s transportation network,but also conform to the concept of low-carbon travel,and are widely concerned and loved by people.However,in reality,social problems such as random parking,malicious destruction,and over-delivery of shared bicycles frequently occur,which seriously hinder the healthy development of shared bicycles.On the surface,this is the reason why users are not aware of how to regulate cars,the platform does not strictly enforce management rules,and government supervision is not in place.In essence,it is the result of a complex game among multi-stakeholders such as users,platforms,and governments,and a serious imbalance in the pattern of interests.Therefore,how to balance the interest interaction between various groups is the key to promoting the healthy and sustainable development of shared bicycles.Based on this,this paper analyzes the evolutionary game from the aspects of strict government supervision,active management of shared bicycle platforms,and user compliance.First,based on the perspective of stakeholders,two evolutionary game models of "user-platform" and "user-platform-government" have been constructed successively;secondly,the stability of the Jacobian matrix is used to analyze the strategy selection and evolution of users and shared bicycle platforms.Factors,as well as the changes in the evolutionary stability strategy of users and shared bicycle platforms under strict government supervision,established the conditions for the behavior of all parties to tend to a stable state;finally,the use of MATLAB numerical simulation to simulate the evolutionary stability strategy under different situations to further verify And analyzed the theoretical results obtained.research results found that:1.The conclusion of the game between the platform and the user:(1)The management cost of the shared bicycle platform and the user’s compliant use cost will affect the evolution of the competition and cooperation relationship between the two parties,and the cost of the two parties’ strategy investment has a negative effect on the increase of its probability.And the rate of change in the probability of the platform choosing the "active management" strategy is greater than that of the user choosing the "compliance use" strategy.(2)Compared with changing a single parameter,the change of multiple parameters has a significant impact on the stability of the game system.2.The conclusion of the tripartite game among shared bicycle platforms,users,and the government:(1)In the system evolution of tripartite participation,which strategy each participant finally chooses is closely related to the cost-to-income ratio of its input,and when the key parameters of each participant take When the value keeps changing,a variety of evolutionary stable strategies appear.(2)Compared with the two-party game,the introduction of the government has played an obvious leading role in the main strategic choice.Although the result of the evolution largely depends on the initial state of the system,the direction of the evolution of the subject’s behavior can be changed through supervision methods such as rewards and punishments,and the system can converge to an ideal state.