The Evolutionary Game Study Of Stakeholders In The Process Of Data Platform Information Leakage

With the disordered expansion of big data resources,the issue of information leakage becomes increasingly prominent.In recent years,data leaks have been exposed frequently,and personal privacy protection has become a major livelihood issue.The problem of information leakage is caused by factors such as extensive management,random data storage of data platforms,and lack of corresponding measures by regulatory authorities,which is essentially the result of the serious imbalance of the interests of the relevant participants in the game.Therefore,to explore the evolution of the game system and the influence of various factors on the system,so that each participant can achieve a balance of interests is a key issue to promote the sound development of data information.To explore the law of information leakage to solve practical problems,this paper studies the formation reasons of information leakage security problems caused by hacker invasion,internal employee leaks data and the evolution of game strategy.First,based on the stakeholder theory,the interests of the information leakage process are analyzed,and four core stakeholders are identified: invaders,insiders,data platforms,and regulatory authorities,and their game process in information leakage is analyzed.Secondly,by setting attack and defense profit and loss coefficients and labor relations coefficients to quantify the degree of data leakage,a three-party evolutionary game model of "invaders,data platforms,and regulatory authorities" and a two-party evolutionary game model of "insiders,data platforms" were constructed.The evolution path of the model under various conditions is analyzed,and the stability of each equilibrium point of the system is analyzed using Lyapunov theory.Finally,the theoretical analysis is verified by MATLAB simulation,and the impact of various parameters on the system is simulated.By defining the ideal state,an attempt is made to modify the system.The research results show that for the tripartite evolutionary game.Under the existing system,the initial intentions of the three parties will not change the evolution direction of the system;The game system will eventually form a situation of strong attack by intruders,advanced defense by operators,and extensive supervision by regulatory authorities;By adjusting controllable parameters,modifying the evolution path,and calculating the parameter range,intruders can reduce their attack level.For the two sides evolutionary game.The strategy choice of the mole is related to illegal gains,platform input and punishment,while the strategy choice of the data platform is related to data value,labor relations and punishment.Due to the interests of each participant,the final game result of "cyclic fluctuation" will be formed by both sides of the game,which is neither affected by the initial willingness nor affected by other controllable parameters.To solve the bottleneck problem that "unable to eradicate",this paper proposes and verifies that through the government promulgates relevant laws and regulations on information protection,the "forced external force" is introduced into the system,thereby to break the cycle to achieve data security governance.