Research On Architectural Stakeholders Based On Evolutionary Game

In recent years,with the rapid development of China’s construction industry,the problems of high energy consumption,serious pollution,low efficiency and low quality of traditional buildings have become increasingly prominent,and the environmental crisis caused by this can not be ignored.At present,China’s construction industry urgently needs transformation and upgrading.As a new construction method of high efficiency,high quality,low energy consumption and low pollution,prefabricated building is not only an important new start to achieve "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals",but also the key to promote the transformation and upgrading of China’s construction industry.At present,China has been vigorously promoting prefabricated buildings.However,due to the positive externalities and high cost of prefabricated buildings,the stakeholders of prefabricated buildings have some problems,such as low participation enthusiasm,conflict of interest and lack of close cooperation,which leads to the slow development of prefabricated buildings.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study prefabricated buildings from the perspective of stakeholders and put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions on promoting the sustainable and healthy development of prefabricated buildings in China.As so,my thesis firstly expounds the concept of the prefabricated buildings,stakeholder theory,evolutionary game theory and economic externality theory in detail by analyzing relevant domestic and foreign literature.Secondly,it defines the core stakeholders of prefabricated buildings,namely the governments,developers and consumers,and then analyzes the behavior and game feasibility of stakeholders.Then it respectively builds the "developer-consumer" two-party evolutionary game model without government participation and the "government-developer-consumer" three-party evolutionary game model with government participation analyzing the interaction of strategy choice among stakeholders and it analyzes the stable evolutionary strategies of each participant in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game model in detail using the MATLAB software to simulate and analyze the theoretical model.Finally,according to the results of game analysis and simulation analysis,this paper puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions from the three aspects of government,developers and consumers,so as to promote the rapid development of prefabricated buildings in China and promote the comprehensive transformation and upgrading of the construction industry with the industrialization of new buildings.The research shows that under certain conditions,the game between the government,developers and consumers can reach an ideal state,that is,the government economic incentive,developers develop prefabricated buildings and consumers buy prefabricated buildings.The government’s economic incentives play a positive role in promoting the choice of developers and consumers,and make developers and consumers reach the optimal equilibrium faster.In the game system of prefabricated buildings,the key influencing factors of developers are: The financial subsidies and tax incentives provided by the government for the developers of prefabricated buildings,the punishment costs of the government for the developers of undeveloped prefabricated buildings,and the benefits and costs of the developers’ own development of prefabricated buildings;The key influencing factors of consumers are: the financial subsidies and loan preferences provided by the government for prefabricated building consumers,and the income and cost of consumers’ own purchase of prefabricated buildings.