Research On Competition And Cooperation Evolution And Docking Game Of Tianjin-Hebei To Undertake Beijing Manufacturing Enterprises

The orderly relocation of Beijing’s non-capital functions is a key link and an important catch hand in the coordinated development of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei,while the relocation of manufacturing enterprises is the core content of the relocation of non-capital functions,which is also the key to optimize the regional layout of industry and promote the high-quality coordinated development of Beijing-TianjinHebei manufacturing industry.Tianjin and Hebei,as the practice subjects of the coordinated development of Beijing,are the first choice to undertake the relocation of manufacturing enterprises from Beijing.However,due to the unclear orientation of the industry of Tianjin and Hebei,the vicious competition of each undertaking place lead to serious industrial isomorphism in Tianjin and Hebei,and the orderly transfer and precise docking of Beijing’s manufacturing enterprises are blocked.In addition,due to the risks of industrial transfer and undertaking,and the differences in interest demands between manufacturing enterprises and undertaking places,the process of Beijing’s manufacturing enterprises docking is slow.Therefore,in order to solve the problem of vicious competition between Tianjin and Hebei,and the problem of interest coordination between industrial transfer and docking subjects,this thesis take the undertaking places with comparative advantages,and the undertaking place and manufacturing enterprise as the research objects respectively,construct the evolutionary game model of competition and cooperation for undertaking manufacturing enterprises in Tianjin and Hebei,construct the evolutionary game model of the docking between manufacturing enterprises and Tianjin-Hebei industry,and establish the corresponding multi-agent simulation model,explore the key factors and strategy evolution path that affect the behavior decision of game subjects,the specific research contents are as follows:1.The research hotspots and frontiers of manufacturing transfer and docking in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as well as the influencing factors of industrial transfer are summarized,and the literature is reviewed from two aspects of regional division of labor and competition and cooperation.This thesis expound the research background and significance of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei manufacturing enterprise transfer and docking from both practical and theoretical aspects,and determine the research content and overall thinking of this thesis.On this basis,visual analysis of research hotspots and research frontiers in the field of manufacturing enterprise transfer and docking in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is conducted with Cite Space document metrological analysis software,and the key factors affecting industrial transfer and docking are summarized and sorted out.Finally,literature review is conducted from two aspects of regional division of labor and regional competition and cooperation to lay a theoretical foundation for the following research.2.Construction and analysis of competition and cooperation game model for Tianjin-Hebei to undertake manufacturing enterprises in Beijing.Based on the location advantages and resource endowments of Tianjin and Hebei,take Tianjin and Hebei,which have comparative advantages,as the research object,this thesis construct the competitive and cooperative evolutionary game model of Tianjin and Hebei undertaking manufacturing enterprises from Beijing,discuss the evolutionary and stable game strategy of Tianjin and Hebei based on constraint conditions,and explore the cooperative path of Tianjin and Hebei undertaking manufacturing enterprises.The results show that the competition and cooperation behaviors of Tianjin and Hebei provinces depend on their own benefits.When at least one party of Tianjin and Hebei provinces have the initiative for cooperation,they will cooperate after a long-term game.3.Construction and analysis of the docking game model between Beijing manufacturing enterprises and Tianjin-Hebei industry.On the basis of making clear the division of labor and positioning of the regional manufacturing industry and avoiding the vicious competition between Tianjin and Hebei,in order to accelerate the landing docking between Beijing manufacturing enterprises and the target undertaking place,this thesis take the undertaking place government and Beijing manufacturing enterprises as the research object,establish the docking game model between Beijing manufacturing enterprises and the Tianjin-Hebei industry,and discuss the evolution path and stability of the strategies of the undertaking place government and manufacturing enterprises under different circumstances.This thesis reveal the evolution law and cooperation path of the behavior of both sides of the game in the process of inter-regional transfer of manufacturing enterprises.The results show that the preferential policy of undertaking place is the necessary condition for the relocation behavior of manufacturing enterprises,and the undertaking behavior of undertaking place government is related to the government financial subsidy,undertaking cost and additional income of undertaking industry.4.ABM simulation of Tianjin-Hebei competition and Cooperation evolutionary game model and government-enterprise industry docking game model.The multi-agent simulation model is constructed based on the Tianjin-Hebei competition and cooperation evolutionary game model and the government-enterprise industry docking game model.Netlogo simulation software is used to simulate the interaction process and emergence of game subjects,and the key factors affecting the behavior and decision-making of game subjects are explored,so as to put forward countermeasures and suggestions,in order to promote the orderly transfer and precise docking of manufacturing enterprises in Beijing.The results show that when the value of revenue sharing coefficient falls within a reasonable range,cooperation is a stable strategy of evolutionary game.The central government’s cost subsidy intensity,fine amount and government reward base had positive influence on the cooperation between the two sides of the game.When manufacturing enterprises are under great pressure of environmental regulation from the local government,relocation behavior will occur,and the great risk of industrial transfer will restrain the relocation behavior of manufacturing enterprises,especially small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises.