Study On The Evolutionary Game Of Supply Of Collective-owned Commercial Construction Land Among Counties

As the basic unit to promote the integrated development of urban and rural areas,county plays an important role in reasonably Coordinating Land Resources and effectively supplying collective-owned commercial construction land.The circulation of collectiveowned commercial construction land into the market is being promoted in an all-round way,and rural farmers get more income from increasing land income.However,the county governments are facing the problem of declining land revenue.Since the relevant rules of the marketization have not been issued,there is speculation in the supply of collectiveowned commercial construction land into the market.In order to improve the revenue of county government and standardize the supply environment of collective-owned commercial construction land,this paper takes the developed and underdeveloped counties with geographical proximity and gap in economic development level as the main body of evolutionary game,and uses evolutionary game method and simulation analysis method to study.By analyzing the basic situation of typical pilot counties’ collective-owned commercial construction land entering the market,this paper discusses the impact of collective-owned commercial construction land entering the market on counties,rural areas and farmers,and uses the evolutionary game method to select the collection proportion of land adjustment fund,the total income of collective-owned commercial construction land entering the market,the resulting industrial value-added revenue,the income of collective-owned construction land expropriation,land expropriation compensation fee,illegal income,land loss of illegal transaction,supervision probability The input cost of infrastructure construction,financial incentives from the superior government and government subsidies are taken as model parameters.Based on four typical situations: cooperation-cooperation,noncooperation-cooperation,cooperation-noncooperation,noncooperation-noncooperation,on the basis of model solution,the evolutionary stability strategy and influencing factors of neighboring developed county governments and underdeveloped county governments are analyzed under the background of collective-owned commercial construction land entering the market.Through numerical simulation analysis,the dynamic evolution process of both sides of the game is displayed when single-parameter change and multi-parameter changed,and the effects of parameter change on strategy selection is analyzed by visual pictures.The results show that:(1)there are two evolutionary stability strategies in the game process of county government,one is cooperation-cooperation,the other is noncooperationnoncooperation.The simulation results are consistent with the calculation results of the dynamic equation of evolutionary game.(2)The results of numerical simulation analysis show that the strategy choice of inter county government mainly depends on the revenue and cost of land expropriation,the supervision of superior government,the punishment for violations,the industrial value-added revenue brought by market circulation and the investment in infrastructure construction.Increasing the supervision probability and violation cost of higher-level governments,increasing the industrial value-added revenue under the cooperation mode,appropriately reducing the revenue of land expropriation and reasonable land expropriation compensation fees are conducive to promoting the evolution of county governments in the direction of cooperation.(3)We can promote inter county cooperation by improving the income distribution mechanism of land appreciation,strengthening supervision and punishment for violations,optimizing industrial planning and structure,and comprehen-sively promoting the reform of market entry and land acquisition system.