Research On Evolutionary Game Of Participants In Assembled Building Quality Chain Under Dynamic Reward And Punishment Mechanism

With the promotion of the concept of green environmental protection and construction industrialization,prefabricated buildings have become the main driving direction of the development of construction industrialization.Currently,China is in the rapid development stage of prefabricated buildings.In order to ensure its stable and good development,quality management in the development process of prefabricated buildings is still the top priority.The construction of prefabricated buildings involves multiple stages and subjects,and the quality behavior of participants in each stage will affect the final quality of prefabricated buildings.Therefore,it is necessary to study the quality management issues of prefabricated buildings from the perspective of behavior strategy selection of each participant,clarify the game relationship and evolution path between each participant in each stage,and solve the problem of participants choosing reverse quality behavior.Firstly,this article determines the research perspective by analyzing the research background and the current research situation at home and abroad,and lays a theoretical foundation for studying relevant concepts and theories,providing a basis for later analysis of issues;Then,the construction stages of prefabricated buildings are analyzed,and the relationship between each construction stage and each participant is clarified.Then,this paper studied the production chain and construction chain of prefabricated buildings,and determined the influencing factors of the quality behavior strategy selection of participants in the two stages.Under the conditions of asymmetric information and bounded rationality,an evolutionary game model for the quality behavior of participants in the production chain and the construction chain is constructed,and the stability of the equilibrium point is analyzed.Further use Matlab software to conduct numerical simulations for different situations to verify the stability analysis results and dynamically present the evolution paths in different situations.Next,according to the corresponding situation of the two models,dynamic punishment and dynamic reward mechanisms are introduced into the two evolutionary game models,respectively.The results verify that the introduction of dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms has a positive effect on participants.Finally,according to the specific situation of the production chain and construction chain,targeted countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to standardize the quality behavior management of each participant.The results show that dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms can promote changes in the behavioral strategy choices of each participant.(1)In the assembly building production chain,the dynamic penalty mechanism plays a positive role in the quality behavior strategy selection of component manufacturers and quality supervision agencies,and can promote the strategic selection of both parties to reach a balance point.(2)In the construction chain of prefabricated buildings,the dynamic incentive mechanism plays a positive role in the quality behavior strategy selection of the construction unit and the supervision unit,which can effectively increase the probability of both parties choosing positive quality behavior and shorten the time for the supervision unit to conduct positive quality behavior.The research conclusions of this article provide theoretical reference for the construction authorities to supervise and regulate the quality behavior of various participants in prefabricated buildings.