Research On The Evolution Simulation Of The Collusion Participants’ Behavior Decision-making In Construction Projects

Collusion is common in the bidding of construction projects,which poses a serious threat to the fair competition order of China’s construction market and hinders the healthy and sustainable development of China’s construction industry.The bidders reach a bidding alliance through private agreement to bid for the construction project.Collusion has strong concealment and is not easy to supervise.The mechanism of collusion is complex.Governments had taken special actions and got some achievements.However,these actions were not concluded from the behavior decision-making mechanism of collusive participants.Measures fail to achieve source control.Therefore,this study analyzed the decision-making law of each participant.And it revealed the evolution mechanism of collusion system.According to the evolutionary simulation results of the decision-making of the participants in different situations,the corresponding governance suggestions were put forward.First of all,based on the collusion theory and stakeholder theory,this paper constructed a three-party game model,includes the collusion organizer,the collusion participant and the administrative supervision department.Based on the model,the replication dynamic equation of each participant was derived,and the decision-making evolution law of each participant were analyzed.Secondly,the system dynamics model of collusion was constructed by Vensim.Based on the replication dynamic equation,the function relationships between model variables were constructed.The data needed for the model is mainly extracted from one judgment and four reports on the collusion,combined with expert interviews and reasonable analysis assumptions.Using this model,the collusion system’s stable states and evolution law were revealed..Finally,five scenarios were set up from the perspectives of bidders and government to discuss the influence of enterprise competitiveness,relationship length,initial state,discovery probability and punishment intensity on the evolution of the bidding system.The results show that:(1)There are two stable states for the collusion system.The first stable state is that the collusion organizer organizes collusion,the collusion participant participates collusion,and the administrative supervision department supervises the collusion.Another stable state is that the collusion organizer does not organize collusion,the collusion participant does not participate collusion,and the administrative supervision department does not supervise the collusion.(2)In the current environment and conditions,the system will gradually evolve to the first stable state.If strong measures are not taken,bad money will drive out good money eventually,and the market order will be seriously ruined.(3)The relationship between collusion organizer and participant is generally close and the collusion organizations is very stable.Collusion organizer and participants are likely to collusion again.Expanding coverage and increasing economic penalties will not provide an effective deterrent.The ability of identification is the key to effectively deal with collusion.According to the understanding of collusion and the results of research,suggestions can be made from four aspects,namely,optimizing bidding methods,innovating collusion supervision,promoting credit system construction,strengthening the guidance of industry associations.The study revealed the decision-making mechanism of the collusion organizer,the collusion participant and the administrative supervision department.At the same time,the law of collusion evolution was tested.Research conclusions enrich theoretical research on bidding decision.It is helpful for the government to formulate the measures to deal with collusion.And the problem of collusion will be solved efficiently.It can promote the healthy and sustainable development of China’s construction industry.