Illegal Parking Management Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

With the advancement of urbanization and the improvement of living standards,the number of motor vehicles in China is increasing rapidly.The limited land use in urban central areas result in the shortage of parking space,leading to the seriousness of illegal parking on the road.It will have a severe impact on dynamic traffic,not only reducing road capacity,resulting in traffic congestion,but also causeing traffic accidents,which are not conducive to the stable and healthy operation of the traffic system.The frequency of inspections by law enforcement officers is determined according to experience.When the frequency of inspections is large,the number of illegal parking is reduced,the frequency of inspections is small,and the number of illegal parking increases.The research purpose of the thesis includes two aspects.First,how to find the optimal supervision frequency through theoretical analysis,change the status quo of using the experience to conduct supervision;second,study the new management mechanism to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of illegal parking management.The workload and research results of this paper are mainly reflected in two aspects.Firstly,based on the theory of evolutionary game and the principle of bounded rationality of traffic participants,the evolutionary game model of vehicle drivers' parking violation and traffic administrators' patrol operation is constructed,and the evolutionary analysis of participants' behavior and the sensitivity analysis of parameters affecting the center point are carried out.Secondly,based on the assumption of bounded rationality of the actor,the evolutionary game theory is used to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model of the third party supervisors,traffic managers and drivers.From the perspective of the third-party supervision,the paper analyzes the illegal parking behavior on urban roads and works on the solution to evolutionary stability.Evolutionary stability analysis is used to determine the attendance probability interval of third-party supervisors.In this interval,the choice probability of driver's illegal parking tends to zero,and the problem of illegal parking on urban roads is improved.Through case analysis,the impact of driver's net expenditure and illegal parking penalty on stability is obtained.This paper provides a theoretical basis for the introduction of third-party supervision mechanism,and determines the third-party supervision probability interval when the evolution tends to be stable through evolutionary stability analysis.At the same time,it provides a reference for the reasonable formulation of parking charging policy and illegal punishment.The research results can be Provide theoretical guidance for effectively alleviating the phenomenon of illegal cars.