Font Size: a A A

Empirical Research On The Behavior And Preventive Mechanism About Collusion In Bidding Field Of Construction Projects

Posted on:2013-04-19Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2232330392450321Subject:Structural engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The bidding system was brought in China in the80s of the20th century,and has gone to the legalization stage since the issue of “The Bidding Law ofthe People’s Republic of China” in2000, promoting the fair and freedomcompetition. But in recent years, the occurrence frequency of collusion is onthe rise in bidding field of construction project, which seriously affects thehealthy development of our construction market. Therefore, the research onthe behavior and preventive mechanism about collusion in bidding fieldprovides scientific basis of policy-making to the healthy development ofbuilding trade. It has important realistic significance to set up a fair andefficient construction market, to overcome economic crimes, and to increaseeconomic benefits of the project.Firstly, this paper identifies the intension and the three basic requirements ofcollusion in bidding and compares with other similar behaviors. And the collusiontypes and their manifestations are described in detail, taking tenderee, tenderer andbidding agency as the research object. The harm caused by collusion is analyzed toemphasize the importance of collusion management.Secondly, according to relative literatures and construction practice, this paperdesigns a questionnaire on the current situation of collusion in bidding market andgets large amounts of data through extensive survey. The opinions of constructionmarket about the universality, motivation, effectiveness and feasibility of preventivemeasures are collected. Statistic analysis of the effective data is taken by SPSSsoftware. Average method, frequency statistics method and score assignment methodare adopted to assess the collusion action. The result shows: the collusion betweentenderers is the most widespread and tenderer is the main rent-seeking body;collusion is prone to occur in general contract bidding and construction bidding, andgovernmental investment project becomes the major disaster area; four key externalcauses and four key internal causes are found;"Obstruction" should be taken more attention to prevent collusion, and the feasibility of preventive measures is generallylow, blocking the effect of the measures. Meanwhile, variance analysis method istaken to compare different experts’ opinion about collusion universality andeffectiveness and feasibility of preventive measures.At the same time, an evolutionary game model of collusion in bidding isestablished to discuss the motivation of collusion theoretically. Four factorsinfluencing strategic equilibrium are found. These include the probability of winningbids, transaction cost of collusion, detected probability and punishment after detection.And then, by combination the survey result and theoretical analysis, this paperdiscusses the emergence and development of collusion in bidding.Finally, according to the result of questionnaire survey and theoreticalanalysis, six effective preventive measures are concluded as well as the effective,detailed and specific ways to carry out. The research of this paper providestheoretical basis to formulate effective preventive measures, and also providesreference for the management of collusion problem in construction market.
Keywords/Search Tags:Collusion in bidding, Motivation analysis, Questionnaire survey, Evolutionary game, Preventive mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
Related items