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Analysis On The Players' Behavior Strategies Of Crowdfunding Of PVPA Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

Posted on:2020-06-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y HuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330614465656Subject:Finance
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As one of the “Top Ten Poverty Alleviation Projects”,photovoltaic poverty alleviation has been highly valued by many departments of the China's government.However,there is a huge funding gap in the project,and the problem of financing needs to be solved urgently.As a new type of financing model,crowdfunding applied to PVPA is of great significance for alleviating the pressure of government financial and promoting project development.However,the project involves many stakeholders and complicated relationships.There is a lack of relevant theoretical research and policy discussions.Therefore,this study integrates the government,crowdfunding platform and poor households into the research framework,and constructs a three-party game model based on evolutionary game theory,and analyzes their evolutionary path.Finally,the study simulates and reveal the law of strategies selection of multiple stakeholders and has provided strong support for further targeted policies.According to the results of the game,the evolution of the decision-making behavior of the government,crowdfunding platform and poor households will be affected by the other two parties.When the initial probabilities that the crowdfunding platform chooses the “effort” strategy and the government chooses the “supervision” strategy are higher,the evolution that the poor households choose to “participate” in PVPA is faster.For the government,when the government supervision cost is lower,the government will evolve into the “supervision” strategy faster.For the crowdfunding platform,when the government supervision cost is lower,the operating cost of platform is lower,the potential losses caused by the government supervision is higher,the platform will tend to choose the “effort” strategy faster.For poor households,the government supervision cost is lower,the operating cost of the platform efforts is lower,the potential losses caused by the government supervision is higher,income of the poor households will be more secure,they will evolve into “participation” strategy faster.As an animateur and supervisor of PVPA,the government needs to adjust the incentive for crowdfunding platforms and poor households,so as to fully mobilize their enthusiasm to participate in the project,and make PVPA develop healthily.
Keywords/Search Tags:Photovoltaic Poverty Alleviation Project, Crowdfunding, Evolutionary game theory, Triple game
PDF Full Text Request
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