Research On The Pedestrian Behaviors Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

The pedestrians are an important part of the urban transport systems whose irregularities, such as running red lights, can seriously impacted the normal operation of the system. The thesis hands out and analyses questionnaires to interpret the character of pedestrians. According to the character of pedestrians, the conflict between pedestrians and traffic operators based on the evolutionary game theory is modeled; the process of the pedestrians’running red lights is also described and simulated based on the organic combination of herd behavior and evolutionary game theory. Finding out the factors which affect the pedestrians’behaviors is significant to make the transportation more harmonious.Properties of pedestrians’crossing behavior include mental characteristics and the reason of running red lights is statistical depicted through field research and questionnaire, which can be regarded as the realistic foundation of the model. Based on the analysis of the preceding research, pedestrians’zebra-crossing behavior is analyzed from the perspective of psychology, which includes the psychological characteristics of different kinds of pedestrians, the behaviors of pedestrians’running red lights and the psychology of traffic demand of pedestrians. Pedestrians’crossing behavior is described as a game process, the evolutionary game model between pedestrians and the traffic operator is established from the external view of pedestrians. The cost-revenue relation is revealed through the choice behavior in the evolutionary game model, moreover, a series of conclusion are obtained by simulation. A game model of pedestrians based on evolutionary game theory is established under information asymmetry through questionnaire investigation data, which shows that the pedestrians’decision is influenced by the relationship among economic factor, security factor and time factor.The research found that (1) most pedestrians will obey traffic rules if managers take steps in initial state;(2) pedestrians will obey traffic rules when the sum of economic loss and security risk is higher than their time cost;(3) most pedestrians will break the traffic rules when time cost is considerably larger than the sum of economic loss and security risk.