Study On The Evolutionary Game Of The Behavior Of Each Participating Subject In The Development And Construction Of Intelligent Buildings

With the development of advanced technologies such as Internet of Things,artificial intelligence,cloud computing and machine learning,as well as the construction of a new type of smart city since the 14 th Five-Year Plan,smart buildings,as the smallest physical building units for the development of smart cities,have been vigorously promoted by local governments across the country.In order to ensure that the definition of intelligent building and the current stage of intelligent technology fit,the Ministry of Housing and Construction and other subordinate agencies are constantly updating the evaluation standards for intelligent building design,gradually systematizing and formalizing the development and construction of intelligent buildings.However,under the inherent market system formed by traditional architecture,it is difficult to open the market of intelligent buildings in China at present,and only some of the intelligent houses are oriented to a higher positioning of the population,and the recognition of intelligent buildings by the general public is not high,therefore,the development of China’s intelligent building market is still in the primary stage.Not only that,intelligent buildings in the construction process,can not avoid the same as the traditional construction industry,that is,developers and construction enterprises to take certain speculative behavior to reduce the quality of the project,earn improper income and other issues.It can be seen that,whether it is the development aspect or the construction aspect of intelligent buildings,too many parties involved are entangled together due to the issue of interests,constituting a complex game relationship.Firstly,by introducing microeconomics theory,we analyze the economic motivation of the game relationship among government,developers,public and construction enterprises in the two stages of development and construction from three perspectives:information asymmetry,economic externality and consumer surplus psychology,and determine the necessity of government intervention in the game relationship.Secondly,a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government,developers and the public is constructed to determine the parameters that need to be satisfied and the sensitive factors that influence the change of strategy in the development stage of intelligent buildings to achieve the ideal strategy combination(Positive,Development of intelligent buildings,Purchase of intelligent buildings).Then,by constructing a three-party evolutionary game model of government,developers and construction enterprises,the sensitive factors of developers screened in the process of smart building development are used as important control factors to prevent developers and construction enterprises from taking speculative behaviors in its construction stage,and the influence of the parameter conditions that need to be satisfied for the ideal strategy combination(Regulation,No speculative behavior,No speculative behavior)and the strength of each important control factor on the strategy transformation of developers and construction enterprises are explored.Finally,by selecting an intelligent residential district in QD city as the actual calculation example,through collecting project-related information and existing policy-related data for simulation,we determine whether the current stage of China’s intelligent building development and construction satisfies the ideal strategy combination envisioned,and make predictions on the original parameters from policy borrowing,economic recovery,and technology development,and analyze the future policy of China’s intelligent building development and construction Formulation direction,economic recovery direction,technology breakthrough direction,etc.Several conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis as follows:(1)The economics of positive externalities,consumer surplus psychology,and information asymmetry of smart buildings can all lead to deviations from the desired direction in the strategy choices of the parties involved.(2)Enhancing future revenue and controlling speculative gains are sensitivities shared by developers and the public.In addition,reducing development costs is another key factor for developers to eliminate the positive externalities of smart buildings.(3)Controls or incentives for each of these sensitive factors can effectively stop speculation by developers and construction companies.(4)Through the calculation example of the current stage of China’s intelligent building development policy,economy,technology and other aspects of the forecast,intelligent buildings in the future can be well developed,and for developers and construction enterprises to develop speculative behavior after the penalty standards,but also to effectively control their speculative behavior.(5)In the two game models,although the government strategy is in line with the ideal strategy,there are still drawbacks such as "punishment instead of regulation",the government should adjust its mentality and actively play its role as a regulator.