Research On The Tripartite Game Model Of The Realty Manage From Building Public Rental Housing In The Commerical Housing

Since 2011,our country pursued the policies that build public rental housing in the commercial housing.On the one hand,it promotes the improvement of low-income families’ housing environment and the integration of social classes and forms a mixed urban living pattern.On the other hand,this policy action also brings the problem in the realty management.At present,a series of studies are being carried out in academic circles on the internal mechanism and practical response to this problem.From the perspective of literature,the existing studies include the operation and management of public rental housing and the behavior of the subject under the mixed housing which covers case analysis and the research methods.However,In the research before the article,this paper found that the government,property management and lessee have different group behavior due to financial support,land economic benefits,fairness and other issues.Thus there appear constraints and conflicts.However,the existing research does not involve the perspective of mixed residence,and most of the research methods are based on the double game analysis,failing to take into account the tripartite interest groups to explore management conflicts.Therefore,this paper believes that the research on mixed housing realty management conflict should consider the policy background of building public rental housing in the commerical housing.And it pays attention to the characteristics of system and multi-subjectivity in the mechanism of occurrence.In addition,the main contradiction and the coordination among the three parties also shuold be considered.of course,the analytical methods include the qualitative and quantitative analysis of multiple subjects.This paper research the object of building public rental housing in the commerical housing.Surveying the HZ area in Zhengzhou.Analysing the behaviors between the government 、property company and tenants.At last,analyzing the different evolution path between the inner and outer factors of the interest subjects.On this basis,building the tripartite game model,and getting the results of the visualized game.Furthermore,on account of the game and case results.Through the study of this paper,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Factors of the three parties behavior: through the analysis of the model parameters,this paper found that the lessee is mainly affected by the Cls.Property company is influenced by the Pps and Fps.And the government is mainly influenced by the URge.(2)Conclusions of the tripartite game: from the evolution results of the three-party game model,it can be found that there are eight equilibrium states in the game model presented in this paper.Among them,when the lessee is unable to gain benefits under unreasonable resistance,the property company’benefits of selective management are not obvious,and the public utility increases significantly under the incentive strategy,the system’s evolutionary game stability strategy evolves into the most ideal state(cooperation,non-selective management and incentive).(3)Conclusions of case analysing: the cause of the tripartite conflict in HZ area is the contradiction between property company side and lessee.the lack of government’s incentive policy,the property company’s profit-seeking behavior and lessee’s little citizen ideas are the starting point of conflict.(4)Based on theoretical model and case analysis,toward the realty company,this paper put forward the following Suggestions: Optimizing operational content and improve profitability;Optimizing the relationship with residents and provide targeted services;Optimizing the service concept of the enterprise and combining the public utility promotion with the development culture of the company.