Influencing Factors And Behavior Game Analysis Of Multiparty Collaborative Treatment Of Small And Micro Wetlands

The treatment of small and micro wetlands is of great significance to win the battle of pollution control,implement Rural Revitalization and improve the living environment.With the rapid development of urbanization and rural economy,small and micro wetlands are seriously polluted,which is manifested in inferior class V water bodies,urban black and stinky ditches and rural black and stinky ponds.This not only seriously affects the quality of people's production and life,but also violates the people-centered development idea.The government's "system failure" and "repeated governance and repeated governance" make small and micro water governance in trouble.Although the government and the public gradually strengthen their awareness of governance and participation,there is still a big gap with the beautiful vision of "green water and green mountains".In order to solve the above problems,this study is based on Synergetics,collaborative governance theory and evolutionary game theory,and studies from the following four aspects.Firstly,the related concepts of small and micro wetlands are defined;from the perspective of theory and practice,the main status and collaborative dilemma of multi-party collaborative governance of small and micro wetlands are clarified.On this basis,through literature reading and analysis,18 influencing factors are sorted out from three dimensions of environmental system,governance subject and collaborative relationship.Secondly,based on the principle of order parameter in Synergetics,with expert scoring as the data source,using fuzzy-dematel method,this paper analyzes the logical relationship between the factors,and obtains the key influencing factors,which are the improvement of related laws and regulations,the publicity of governance concept,the improvement of incentive and punishment system,the awareness level of public participation in small and micro water governance,and the improvement of regulatory system.Thirdly,based on the analysis of the behavior of small and micro water governance subject under the interest mechanism,this paper constructs the tripartite evolutionary game model of local government,sewage enterprises and residents,and uses the numerical simulation experiment to get the following results: when certain stable conditions are met,all parties tend to cooperate in governance;the increase of reasonable reward and punishment of local government can effectively promote the evolution of sewage enterprises towards positive governance Results: when the incentive power is too large,the strategy of sewage enterprises presents the evolution result of shock,at this time,the residents strengthen the supervision can stabilize the evolution result of the positive governance strategy of sewage enterprises.Finally,the paper describes the research conclusions and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions,such as improving the relevant laws and regulations,improving the incentive and punishment system,strengthening the publicity of the concept of small and micro water governance and improving the collaborative supervision system.