The Evolutionary Game Between Fourth-party Logistics And Third-party Logistics

With the active promotion of the Chinese government,the total amount of domestic social logistics continues to rise and the market scale continues to increase,but the net interest rate of China's logistics enterprises has not risen accordingly.According to the relevant data disclosed by the China Industry Information Network,China's logistics enterprises,especially after excluding express delivery companies,have hovered around 1% in recent years,while the total growth rate of the logistics industry has remained above 10%,indicating that the cost of China's logistics industry is still high.However,the occurrence of the "fight between the SF Express and the Cainiao Network Technology Co.,Ltd" shows the fragile cooperative relationship between the two sides,especially the participation of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in mediation.It shows that it is difficult for the two sides to establish a long-term cooperation mechanism without the participation of the government.Therefore,it is necessary and urgent to explore how the government,third-party logistics,and fourthparty logistics can jointly promote the upgrading and transformation within the logistics industry.This paper uses the literature retrieval method,comparative analysis method,evolutionary game method,and simulation analysis method.The government,fourthparty logistics,and third-party logistics are the research objects.Based on evolutionary game theory,this paper analyze the strategic change process and stability of the three objects,to discuss the issue of establishing long-term and deep-level cooperative relations among logistics enterprises.In the specific research process,a two-party evolutionary game model with no government participation and a three-party evolutionary game model with government participation are established in the article.The basic income V,excess income v,cost C,loss cost L,and government are considered.The influence of six factors including subsidy a and government punishment f on the government,the third party logistics company,and the fourth party logistics company's behavior strategy choices.The study found that,in the first model,the positive effects of increasing v,L,and decreasing C on the behavioral choices of the two parties without government participation were proved through stability analysis,and this conclusion was verified by the use of MATLAB software to design numerical examples.In the second model,after stability analysis,the stable solution selected by the three-party strategy and the corresponding prerequisites were found.The MATLAB software was used to verify the conclusions generated under the premise of multiple stable solutions,and it was found that The corporate partnership established with the active participation of the government is long-term and stable.Finally,the relevant countermeasures and suggestions are explored from the perspective of influencing factors,providing a theoretical reference and support for how the government promotes logistics enterprise cooperation.It is conducive to improving the willingness of third-and fourth-party logistics companies to cooperate in a targeted manner,building long-term and deep-level cooperation relationships,and promoting the upgrading and transformation of the logistics industry.