Research On Cooperation Mechanism Of VMI Based On Evolutionary Game

In the fierce competition of modern business model,due to the rapid development of the advanced technology and increasingly urgent consumer demand,the adjustment and optimization of the industrial structure must be effectively accelerated for the enterprises.However,the uncertainties of the market environment can result in the “bullwhip effect”.This phenomenon exposes the defect of traditional inventory management.Thus,the vendor management inventory(VMI)was proposed,which can more accurately obtain the demand information.Although the VMI mode exhibits significant superiority compared with the traditional inventory management modes,some problems still need to be resolved for the VMI mode.For example,in VMI modes,the vendors undertake the costs and risks of managing the inventory,but the gains are not increased.Indeed,this is beneficial for the long-term development of the supply chain.However,the profits are significantly damaged for the vendors in the short term,which weakens the motivation of the vendors for applying the VMI mode.Thus,it is crucial to promote the cooperation of supply chain enterprises to resolve the loss of suppliers' profits,cost reduction and efficiency in the short term for the smooth implementation of the VMI model,which is helpful for realizing the overall interests of the supply chain and maximizing the interests of every single enterprise.Based on the above background,the influencing factors and mechanism of VMI mode are investigated in detail with the support of the evolutionary game theory.On this basis,the evolutionary game model is constructed in which the vendor and the manufacturer cooperate to implement the VMI mode,and the process of decision-making evolution of both sides is analyzed.The results indicate that the VMI model of the supply chain will become unsustainable without imposing necessary incentives or penalties,which is due to the loss of the interests of suppliers in the short term.Therefore,supply chain contracts should be introduced for coordination.Under the dual mechanism of benefit sharing and punishment,the punishment intensity is positively correlated with the income after the cooperative implementation of VMI and the strategy decision of both parties.The punishment intensity has an important influence on the evolutionary strategy and the convergence speed of and evolutionary game.The income after the cooperative implementation of VMI also plays an important role in the strategy decision for the vendor and the manufacturer.Under the constraint of supply chain contract and considering the long-term interests of both players,cooperation is the evolutionary equilibrium point of the players.The Matlab numerical simulation results also verified the above conclusions.Based on the above analysis and conclusions,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions to promote the cooperation of supply chain enterprises for implementing the VMI mode from the perspectives of strengthening the trust between enterprises,perfecting the VMI supply chain contract,and improving the benefits after implementing the VMI mode.This has certain reference significance for promoting the cooperation of supply chain enterprises in implementing the VMI mode.