Research On Evolutionary Game Of PPP Project Shared Risk Management Behavior Based On Prospect Theory

The PPP(Public-Private Paternership)model can effectively give play to the respective advantages of the public and private sectors,reduce project costs,improve project efficiency,meet the social public's infrastructure needs and provide the public with high-quality public products and services.China's current development of the PPP model is still in its infancy.In addition,the long operating cycle of PPP projects and imperfect laws and regulations,along with the increasingly widespread application of the PPP model,the corresponding PPP project risk management issues have become increasingly prominent.This has hindered the rapid development and application of the PPP model to some extent.At present,there are few literatures on the decision-making behavior strategies of the public and private sectors in the shared risk management of the PPP project shared risk management process.Research on the public and private PPP project shared risk management behavior strategies is helpful to promote the PPP project shared risk governance.Based on prospect theory,evolutionary game theory and system dynamics,the thesis makes an economic interpretation and evolutionary simulation of the decision-making behavior of the shared risk management behavior of the PPP project shared risk management subjects.First,through relevant literature research and theoretical study,sort out the domestic and foreign relevant research results of PPP project shared risk,evolutionary game and system dynamics and other theories and methods;then,the prospect theory is introduced into the incomplete information evolutionary game revision expectation theory to construct The game model of the evolutionary game between the public and private parties to solve the evolutionary stability strategy has obtained the influencing factors and sufficient conditions for the public and private sectors to actively carry out shared risk management;considering the government's identity as a supervisor in shared risk management,the regulatory evolution of shared risk management behavior is constructed Game model,and the introduction of a reward mechanism based on the interests of the government and the private sector to build a model of the impact of reward changes on risk management decisions of the private sector;Finally,based on the evolutionary game dynamic replication system,a system dynamics simulation model was constructed,through corresponding payment Parameter adjustment to observe the probabilistic change trend of risk management behavior choices in the private sector,accurately assess the sensitivity of related payment parameters to the evolutionary game model,and propose relevant strategies for the governance of PPP project shared risks.