Research On Innovation Activity,investor Selection And Financing Order

High-tech employees are named with high entrepreneurial qualities and their departure entrepreneurial behavior has become the focus of research.A company's competitive advantage is often based on these high-quality human capital,but these talents with high-end skills arnd rich work experiences may leave.As potential entrepreneurs,they need a certain amount of funds to engage in the development of innovatioin opportunities.Entrepreneurs themselves are difficult to afford sufficient funds,so they need to search for external financier's support.There are two different investors:independent venture capital and existing company,which are potential investors likely to be interested in new opportunities and competing for talent.When an employee engaged in an assigned task with existing company,he may get a new idea that is unrelated to her main employment task.The innovation process consists of exploration stage and development stage.The question is when wiIl employee pursues the new idea,and if he turnover to create a new venture to develop innovative opportunities,how do they choose investors?Through constructing a dynamic game model,the impact of multi-task incentives,investor heterogeneity,and property rights protection on high-tech employees' innovation decision-making and investor selection in the start-up phases are studied,from the perspective of employee competition.The study shows that under the same conditions,the stronger the property rights protection is,the easier it is to achieve innovation;When the protection of property rights is strong,if employees decide to engage in innovation activities,even if the cost of exploration of the company is lower,exploration is always funded by the independent venture capital.At the moment of development phase,the investors with efficiency costs will be chosen;when the protection of property rights is weak,the implementation condition of the innovation is that the two investors require the sufficient advantages of development cost than the other party.Especially when the potential investor is a company at development stage,the required cost advantage will be higher.And there no breakaways occur in equilibrium during the employee's innovation process;the equilibrium result is not necessarily optimal.The condition that the value created by the employee in assigned task is higher than the balanced return of innovation for the implementation of innovation is a necessary but not sufficient one;the potential competing for employee from independent venture capital may increases the value of employee.The sequence of finance that choosing the existing company first and then choose the independent venture capital investment are not found in equilibrium.The contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)From the perspective of investors' choice,to study the impact of multi-task incentives,investor heterogeneity,and property rights protection on the above-mentioned process equilibrium;(2)Explain the VC Investment exit mechanism from the perspective of financing at different stages of entrepreneurship.Under the background of IPO being widely studied by scholars,it is more novel to study when VC adopts the equity retreat and withdrawal method in the early stages of venture enterprises.(3)This paper uses game model to study the acquisition of entrepreneurial resources of existing employees in multi-task scenarios.In addition.However,in the current research on the field of entrepreneurship,the use o f this method is less studied.The research of the entrepreneurial field through the game model method has enriched the existing research methods.