Research On The Influence Of Institutional Investor Shareholding On Turnover Of Listed Companies

The institutional investors were born in the western countries in the 60's and developed rapidly in the 80,and our country began to develop institutional investors in the 90,until 21 st century,when they became more and more actively involved in corporate governance,and their role in enhancing corporate performance and stabilizing the capital market continued to loom,However,with regard to whether institutional investors can actively participate in corporate governance and stabilize the capital market,scholars at home and abroad have not had a unified conclusion,through a large number of literature reading,this paper found that the study of institutional investors,the current scholars are from earnings management,executive compensation,dividend policy and R&D Innovation from the perspective of the study,few scholars take the influence of institutional investors on executive change as the main research direction to explore the role of institutional investors in corporate governance,based on which,this paper takes executive change as the starting point to explore the impact of different shareholding ratio of institutional investors on enterprise supervision.Based on the data of A-share listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen in2005-2017,this paper makes an empirical test of the relationship between institutional investor shareholding ratio and executive change,and according to the conclusion of previous scholars,this paper divides the executive change into normal change and forced change to study separately,and then distinguishes the executives,The influence of institutional investors on the Chairman and CEO was studied respectively,and further,they were divided into independent,non-independent,stable and transactional institutional investors according to whether institutional investors had business relations with their shareholding companies and whether Institutional investor holdings were stable,and their impact on executive changes was tested separately.Results found that:(1)After distinguishing the executive change into mandatory change and normal change,this paper finds that institutional investors only have an impact on the mandatory change of executives,and the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors,the more likely the executive to make changes,and there is no significant relationship between institutional investors and the normal changes of executives,This suggests that institutions with high shareholding ratios will be more actively involved in the regulation of the company.(2)After dividing the high district into chairman and CEO,this paper finds that institutional investors only have a significant positive effect on the mandatory change of the CEO,and there is no significant impact on the mandatory change of the chairman,which may be compared with the Chairman,the CEO as a professional manager,will be more responsible for the daily management of the company,In the event of poor performance,shareholders are the first choice to make mandatory changes to the CEO.(3)Taking into account the heterogeneity of institutional investors,this paper finds that only independent and stable institutional investors have a positive impact on CEO mandatory changes,while non-independent and transactional institutional investors have no significant impact on CEO mandatory changes.This is because non-independent institutional investors and enterprises have interests,sometimes in their own interest,and do not exercise effective regulatory activities,and trading institutional investors invest in order to obtain the excess income from short-term level two market transactions,and therefore do not care about the company's operating conditions,let alone actively participate in the supervision of enterprises.The robustness test part,this article has carried on the test from a few five aspects,namely: redefines the scope of the forced change,the variable performance replacement and the industry adjustment,divides the sub-sample according to the property right nature,introduces the tool variable and so on five methods to carry on the robustness test to the research conclusion,the result shows the main conclusion of this paper is still Finally,this paper makes a systematic arrangement of theoretical analysis and empirical results,and puts forward policy suggestions to the Government and enterprises accordingly.From the perspective of executive change,this paper studies the influence of the change of institutional investor's shareholding ratio on the efficiency ofenterprise supervision,and enriches the relevant literature of institutional investors on enterprise supervision.Secondly,this paper studies the different influences of the Chairman and CEO in the enterprise supervision,and enriches the relevant research on the enterprise executives.Finally,through the classification study of heterogeneous mechanism certification,this paper confirms the positive role of independent and stable institutional investors in corporate governance.