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Research On Intergovernmental Sharing Of Dry Port System And Coordinated Development Of International Trade

Posted on:2021-01-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y ChiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330614970861Subject:International Trade
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The growth of international trade promotes the rapid development of container transportation in ports.As the growth of the scale of port,the port city's transportation,environment,urban space has brought many problems,there are increasing contradictions between harbour city,has become the core issue of international container port development at home and abroad.Although the ban on container trucks in port cities can alleviate the contradiction,it will hinder the development of port economy and affect the competitiveness of port,regional economy and trade.From the perspective of the exploration and practice of ports at home and abroad,the construction of dry ports is an effective way to improve the operation efficiency of ports and alleviate the "port city contradiction" in coastal port cities.The construction of dry port system usually crosses multiple administrative regions such as port cities and hinterland cities,and its infrastructure construction and operation require a large amount of financial investment.Therefore,it will involve intergovernmental sharing of financial resources needed for dry port construction and sustainable operation between port cities and hinterland cities.Reasonable allocation of financial resources is the basic guarantee for dry port construction and operation.This paper constructs a game model to discuss the intergovernmental sharing of the dry port system.Firstly,the voluntary supply model of public goods in dry port system is constructed.This paper analyzes whether the voluntary supply shared by the government between the port city and the hinterland city can reach the Pareto Optimum.Secondly,construct the tripartite game model(introduce the superior government).Through the three-party game model,the paper analyzes the influence of the superior government's "intervention" on the intergovernmental action strategy of port city and hinterland city.Then,the cooperative game model is constructed(import and export trade enterprises are introduced).After analyzing the cooperative game results,the Shapley value method is used to solve the criterion of intergovernmental sharing.Finally,this paper combines the case and research results to put forward relevant suggestions.As the system of Shenzhen's container close dry port spans multiple administrative regions,and the construction and operation of the dry port requires a large amount of capital investment,the intergovernmental sharing of financialresources required for the construction and sustainable operation of the dry port system is a very significant representative.In this paper,the system of Shenzhen container close dry port is selected as the case study object.The following conclusions are drawn after the game model results are analyzed.Firstly,the financial resources needed for the construction and sustainable operation of dry ports cannot reach Pareto Optimum under the condition of voluntary supply by local governments,and the difference increases with the increase of the number of cross-administrative regions of dry ports.Secondly,the intervention of the superior government affects the strategic balance between hinterland cities and port cities.The superior government can encourage the port city and hinterland city to choose "not to share" by increasing the punitive measures.Thirdly,after solving the cooperative game model,it is found that under the condition that enterprises do not replace or move away from the hinterland,the benefits of the alliance of port cities and import and export trade enterprises,and the alliance of hinterland cities and port cities are better than that of non-alliance.The alliance of ports and hinterland cities,the alliance of all participants and the alliance under other strategies should meet certain conditions to achieve better profits.If the conditions are not met,the major league to minor league cooperation still exists.This proves that in the intergovernmental sharing of dry port construction and operation,it is better to seek human cooperation in order to achieve the goal of profit maximization.Finally,this paper uses Shapley value method to calculate the expected benefits of the three parties in the case of cooperation,and analyzes the criteria of intergovernmental sharing.
Keywords/Search Tags:Dry port, Coordinated Development of International Trade, Intergovernmental Sharing, Intergovernmental Game
PDF Full Text Request
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