Evolutionary Game Research On Port Dangerous Goods Management From The Perspective Of CSR

With the continuous development of ports in China,the type of dangerous goods in the port and transport continue to rise,according to port regulations of dangerous goods,there is a game relationship between the government and port enterprises,and in this game relation,the local government and port enterprise bargaining position and bargaining power,lead to conflicts of interest between the local government and port enterprises tend to be invisible,influence the effect of local government supervision,lead to hazardous port caused by sudden accidents there are more and more seriously,port demand for public safety and environmental protection has become more and more urgent.Therefore,how to balance the relationship between port enterprises and government managers becomes the key to solve the problem of dangerous goods management.This paper introduces the corporate social responsibility and the research trend of the development of port dangerous goods,and then from the related theory of port dangerous goods port introduces the definition and the accident classification of dangerous goods,according to the special port operation mode,and the port privatization and principal-agent theory is discussed in this paper,and the research method of evolutionary game theory and system dynamics is applied in this article has carried on the brief summary.Second,according to the problems of port dangerous goods management and service of the supply chain structure analysis,determine the research subject and research perspective of this article,in view of the port enterprise and the government in the regulatory process there is a wrong copy dynamic game,information into theory,port privatization and principal-agent problems,first of all to build the local government and port enterprises on both sides of the evolutionary game model,analysis under local government supervision,the change of port enterprise performance of the corporate social responsibility,on this basis,according to the principal-agent theory,building government operators,port resources and port logistics service provider evolutionary game model of the three parties,Combined with system dynamics simulation analysis.This will be more conducive to the improvement of port safety and dangerous goods management theory,making up for the lack of existing relevant research.The results show that:the factors such as supervision eost,Punishment intensity,management cost,subsidy and illegal profit will influence the game behavior of the government,port resource operators and port logistics service providers.In the process of port dangerous goods management,the local government plays the leading role3 and it is the most ideal state for the government to adopt the supervision strategy for port enterprises.The strategy adopted by port enterprises largely depends on the size of parameters determined by the local government.Local govermment to build a good business environment,help port enterprises to raise revenue,can promote the probability of port enterprise performance of the corporate social responsibility,while the penalties of local governments to port enterprises should be greater than the port enterprise violate compasses operation,increasing the penalties can effectively reduce the ratio of port enterprise violate compasses operation.Therefore,the management mode of port resource operators and port logistics service pro viders based on corporate social responsibility is applicable to the management of dangerous goods in ports.