Research On Safety Supervision Of Dangerous Goods Air Transportation By Game Theory

In order to ensure the continuous safety of air transportation of dangerous goods,the government must supervise the entire process of airlines transporting dangerous goods.Effective supervision can promote all responsible parties’ implementation of safety assurance policies,it also can reduce the probability of unsafe accident during the air transportation of dangerous goods.Government regulatory agencies and airlines have different pursuit of interests and they always be interacted by each other,it proves the two parties’ game information are continuing to change,it also promotes the evolution of the game.In order to explore the influence of various factors on the system equilibrium in the evolution process,the relevant principles of system dynamics are introduced,and relevant optimization dynamic supervision strategies are proposed.Based on the current situation of dangerous goods air transportation safety supervision,this dissertation compares the similarities and differences between Chinese and foreign legal systems and related regulatory organizations,and summarizes the weakness that need to be improved in China,and provides a way for improving dangerous goods air transportation safety supervision systems,and put forward theoretical suggestions and countermeasures.According to the thinking from the traditional game to the evolutionary game,the traditional game’s shortcomings are overcome in actual dangerous goods air transportation safety supervision problem.The equilibrium solution of the system is solved by the parties’ replication dynamic equation in the game,and the Friedman theory is introduced to verify the stability of each equilibrium solution.In order to make the solution more practical,the game model is simulated with the aid of System Dynamics.The system is simulated under the initial conditions of pure strategy and mixed strategy,and the output result shows a fluctuating state with no convergence trend.The optimized control strategy is introduced,the output of the system tends to be stable based on a dynamic penalty strategy and a dynamic supervision strategy.Two important factors are discussed which influencing the safety supervision of dangerous goods air transportation: government supervision ability and the probability of unsafe incidents when airlines transit dangerous goods in violation of regulations,the equilibrium stability of two players’ strategies in this game is analyzed.In order to ensure the continuous safety of dangerous goods in air transportation,the theoretical guidance for the improvement of government supervision department and airlines’ strategies in the safety supervision of dangerous goods air transportation is put forward.