An Evolutionary Game Analysis On The Strategic Choice Of The Subject Of Mortgage Loan For Farmland Management Rights

Our national economy and people’s livelihood are related to "The three rural issues",and they are fundamental issues,China’s agricultural support system is relatively weak,rural financial reform task is arduous,to activate land assets,give farmers more property rights,meet rural capital needs,and give full play to the economic value of rural land,the relevant policies of the country in recent years have clearly pointed out that the contracted land-use rights may be allowed to mortgaged to agricultural financial institutions,and has successively carried out the "rural reform pilot area" and the pilot work of the rural contracted land management right mortgage loan,which has achieved certain results and It has been fully promoted,but it still faces many problems.These problems restrict the credit effects of agricultural business entities and financial institutions.Therefore,based on these problems,we should optimize the strategic choices of agricultural business entities and financial institutions,and promote the mortgage of agricultural land management rights.Continue to develop.This paper first uses the literature research method to sort out the domestic and foreign research trends on agricultural land mortgage loans,and then uses the agricultural land management rights mortgage model in Zaozhuang City,Shandong Province as an empirical case to analyze the current situation and effect of mortgage business of the right of farmland management in Zaozhuang City.Find the reasons for restricting the progress of Zaozhuang farmland management right mortgage loans,and incorporate the impact factors into the earnings matrix of the evolutionary game model,construct a replication dynamic equation for the two groups of agricultural management entities and financial institutions,and explore the evolutionary trends of the two groups by the change of parameters And the effect of evolutionary stability strategy,and finally,the empirical data of the empirical case of farmland management right mortgage loan in Zaozhuang City were used for simulation verification,and the following conclusions were drawn:(1)The mortgage rate of the farmland management right mortgage in Zaozhuang City is too low,which has affected the progress of the farmland management right mortgage loan in Zaozhuang City.The current mortgage rate of farmland management right mortgages in Zaozhuang City is too low.In some cases,the loan mortgage rate only accounts for 5.8%of the farmland management right mortgage loans and has not yet reached the general loan mortgage rate of 10%.According to the model results,when the loan interest rate is higher than 16.2%,the direction of evolution will only apply for loans to agricultural business entities,and the evolution of financial institutions’ lending.Such a low loan mortgage rate has affected the probability of agricultural business entities and financial institutions to choose strategies.If we continue to follow this status quo,the mortgage business in Zaozhuang City may eventually become "unsustainable."(2)The pre-loan costs of agricultural business entities affect the evolution results.With the increase in the loan cost and guarantee fee rate of agricultural business entities,not only will the rate of evolution to the desired result gradually slow down,but the result of the evolution will eventually evolve into an unsatisfactory state in which agricultural business entities do not apply for loans and financial institutions do not lend.(3)The problem of difficult disposal of collaterals needs to be solved urgently.As of 2018,there has not been a case of successful disposal of collateral in Zaozhuang City.Such a low success rate of collateral disposal has reduced the psychological expectation of agricultural business entities to lose collateral.After applying for a loan,whether they repay the loan or default,they can get more benefits than not applying for the loan,so"morbidly" promote the evolutionary result Applying for loans to agricultural business entities,the evolution of lending by financial institutions.Such a result is formed on the premise of sacrificing the interests of the guarantee company,and does not have the ability of sustainable development.Whether the government continues to inject money into the guarantee company in order to unconditionally understand the risks and prevent and control the risk is worth pondering.Finally,based on the current situation analysis,evolutionary game and simulation analysis of the farmland management right mortgage loan in Zaozhuang City,this paper is targeted from three perspectives:improving the loan mortgage rate,reducing the cost of agricultural application,and increasing the success rate of collateral disposal.It proposes solutions suitable for the current mode of Zaozhuang,optimizes the farmland management right mortgage loan model in Zaozhuang City,in order to promote the sustainable development of the farmland management right mortgage loan business in Zaozhuang and provide experience and lessons for other regions of the country.