Game Action Of Peasant Households In Farmland Mortgage

The experiment of farmland mortgage facilitates the financing of peasant householdsonce puzzled by the mortgage restriction in large-scale operation. However, the game actionsof peasant households in farmland mortgage are still deteriorated, in which some peasantswho lack funds refer other channels to farmland mortgage or avoid the debt. Since, the paperresearches the game action of peasant households in farmland mortgage under differentconstraint conditions taking Linyi City, Shandong Province for illustration, in order tofacilitate the reference of farmland mortgage system.At first, the paper reviews the history and present situation of farmland mortgage inChina and the situation and problem of farmland mortgage of peasant households. Then itconducts empirical analysis of factors of game action of peasant households in farmlandmortgage through the financing choosing. With the multinomial logistic regression, we knowthe land circulation and cooperatives facilitate the mortgage of farmland, while the weakcirculation service system and society security and prohibitive laws have negative influence.Cooperatives, income and society capital affect the traditional financing.Secondly, the paper analyses the borrowing game action of peasant households indifferent constraint conditions with the dynamic game, concluding the process andmechanism of the influence of the factors on borrowing behavior with farmland mortgage ofpeasant households. Under the constraint of lacking circulation service institutions,non-standard circulation contract and prohibitive laws, the peasant households tend to avoiddebt. If the cost of farmland assessment is too high, they cannot choose the farmlandmortgage. If the assessed value of farmland is unrealistically high or the fluctuation forecast isa failure, the financing choosing will be restricted because the non-performing loans offinance institutions cannot be compensated.Thirdly, with the dynamic game, it conducts analysis of borrowing game action ofpeasant households in the condition that the farmland can be pledged without any constraints.In this condition, the strategy is remarkably optimized and the credit rationing is relieved. Finally, the policy suggestion including optimizing the borrowing game action of peasanthouseholds in farmland mortgage, facilitating the system of farmland mortgage andimproving the service of financial institution are proposed based on the game analysis.