Game Analysis And Empirical Analysis Of The Mechanism Of Fiscal Decentralization On Carbon Emission Reduction

The IPCC 5th reported that carbon dioxide is the key driver of future climate factor,its emissions continue to increase,which causes climate system warming,atmospheric and oceanic temperatures rising,sea levels rising,snow-capped mountains and glaciers melting,and threats to human life in the future.As a superpower with the second largest economy,the largest carbon emissions and population,China has an unshirkable responsibility to actively reduce carbon emissions.Most literature show that China's current political and economic system will undermine efforts to reduce emissions.Therefore,this paper analyzes the behavior strategies of governments at all levels affected by fiscal decentralization in the process of carbon emission reduction,in order to explain that the fiscal decentralization system has an inhibitory effect on carbon emission reduction.Meanwhile,empirical analysis method is used to prove that the improvement of fiscal decentralization is indeed not conducive to carbon emission reduction.Fiscal decentralization results in vertical competition between central government and local government and horizontal competition between local governments.This paper,based on the evolutionary game of finite rationality,illustrates the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of vertical and horizontal competition between governments and the factors affecting the implementation of emission reduction policies in the process of carbon emission reduction.In vertical competition,through trial and error and learning,the supervision and implementation of emission reduction of the central government and local governments will dynamically stabilize at a certain probability,which is related to the central penalty amount,supervision cost and local implementation cost,carbon emission intensity and emission reduction target,respectively.In horizontal competition,the first is that without the carbon constraint assessment of the central government,local governments will not take the initiative to implement emission reduction policies.The second is to show that the relationship between the net benefit of emission reduction implemented by local governments and the central constraint is different,resulting in different evolutionary equilibrium strategies.Only when the central constraint is higher than the net loss of emission reduction implemented by the two local governments,will they both implement emission reduction policies.To avoid unreasonable constraint mechanism,the constraint should be set as a dynamic function,and the parameters are local execution cost and carbon emission intensity,which change with individual characteristics of the region.Evolutionary game proved that under the fiscal decentralization system different governments in the process of carbon reduction according to their respective interests,takedifferent actions to weaken the power reduction.Whether such a conclusion is reliable needs to be further tested.Based on this,we conduct an empirical analysis on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and carbon emissions.Results show that the improvement of local government fiscal decentralization,is not conducive to carbon reduction,namely the fiscal decentralization and carbon exists positive correlation,verify the conclusions of evolutionary game again.In addition,we have found that strong implementation of emission reduction policies,low economic development in the region and excessive carbon emissions will reduce the role of fiscal decentralization.Finally,in view of the problems found in this paper,suggested that the central government should intensify the transfer payment,setting up reasonable punishment mechanism to reduce emissions,and local governments according to their own vulnerability reduction policy,makes every effort to reduce the fiscal decentralization system inhibition of carbon emissions.