The Green Paradox Test And Governance Research Considering The Behavior Differences Of Local Governments Under Central-local Decentralization

The negative externality of environmental pollution and the positive externality of environmental governance are a form of market failure and the starting point of environmental governance by the government.As a public good,the ecological environment quality has the characteristics of regional spillover,so the government's intervention is very important.A series of environmental regulation policies and measures issued by the Chinese government are generally considered to have the effect of reducing emissions.However,some scholars point out that environmental policies may have the effect of "green paradox".Notable is that the different parts of China resources endowment,industrial structure,energy structure,the governance means,environmental bearing capacity,such as there is a big difference,significant differences regional environmental governance,so,will cause a full of debate and interesting topic: under environmental regulation varies in China,China's environmental governance paradox "green" effect happened? Are there differences between regions? Does the decentralized system with Chinese characteristics promote environmental protection?Firstly,this thesis clarifies the influence mechanism of central-local decentralization and local government behavior on environmental pollution.On this basis,based on STIRPAT model,it verifies whether there is "green paradox" effect in environmental governance in China,and clarifies the influence of central-local decentralization and local government behavior on environmental pollution.Then,it focus on the different environmental governance main body behavior characteristic,based on the interests balance perspective,along China's environmental governance practices,set up the principal-agent model of the central government and local government and local government economic preference and evolutionary game model of environmental preferences of local governments,analyses the profits and losses of the main parties in the process of environmental governance game relationship.The results show that there is a certain effect of "green paradox" in China's environmental governance,the influence of central-local decentralization on pollution emissions is an inverted u-shaped curve,and the economic behavior of local governments aggravates environmental pollution.In terms of sub-regions,central-land decentralization has a significant impact on western provinces,while central-land decentralization has an insignificant impact on eastern and central regions.From the point of view of the direct effect of local government environmental governance,the western region shows the effect of "green paradox",while the eastern region and central region do not.From the indirect effect of local government environmental governance,environmental regulation in the eastern region has a significant effect on technological innovation and foreign direct investment,while environmental regulation in the central and western regions has a significant effect on economic restructuring.The incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism can enhance the efforts of local governments to manage the environment,and there is a substitution effect between the incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism.Local governments have a natural nature of seeking profits and lack of internal impetus for environmental governance,so they cannot achieve pareto optimality.However,the central government can make the equilibrium state change to the direction of local governments' active environmental governance through the regulation mechanism,so as to achieve "pareto improvement".Finally,based on the empirical analysis and game analysis,the governance mechanism of the "green paradox" should be optimized from the following aspects: clarifying the boundary between power and responsibility of the central government,constructing a unified environmental supervision system,and fostering a low-carbon culture.