Analysis Of Parallel Import Of Trademark Products Base On Game Theory

In recent years,with the internationalization of commodity trade has reached fever pitch,the parallel import of intellectual property products especially trademark products has attracted more and more attention.The conflict between trademark protection and free trade makes it a dilemma on the problem of whether to allow the trademark product parallel import:on the one hand,when a country allows free trade,it means the state will not interfere and restrict import and export trade,allowing commodity freely input and output;on the other hand,a country must protect the trademark holders,in order to safeguard the legal rights of the trademark holders,improve their enthusiasm for innovation,any organization and other people cannot import or export trademark products without the authorization of trademark holders.At present,most countries are not clearly defined on the problem of whether to allow the trademark products parallel import.For the problem of parallel import of trademark products,investigators before mostly studied it with legal analysis,this paper will use the knowledge of game theory,research the problem with the perspective of game theory.First of all,game theory between trademark holders and importer is analyzed when parallel import is prohibited,permitted or no clear policy,giving them the best choice,and the social welfare under different policies;Secondly,the game model between export and import countries is constructed,discussing the parallel import policy preferences on developing countries,developed countries and between developed and developing countries,and suggestions for making policy is given;Finally,in order to demonstrate above theory research,game models are established combined with previous example of parallel import of trademark products,and suggestions on the establishment of parallel import policy of trademark Products are given according to the actual situation of our country.Through the research and analysis,the main conclusions are as follows:First,when the cost of investigation is cheap,it is beneficial to trademark holders to investigate in the market;Second,when the winning rate is less than 1/2,parallel importers will certainly choose to import;Third,on the condition of no clear parallel import policy of trademark product,when the cost of the investigation is cheap,game equilibrium is affected by winning rate,prosecution expense and profit of the parallel importers,and when the investigation cost is expensive,game equilibrium will also be affected with the import probability of parallel importers and prosecution probability of trademark holders;Fourth,most countries should adopt a cooperative attitude to allow parallel importation,it helps each country to increase the total social welfare,but relatively developed countries,because of its economic development level is better than that of other countries,the number of trademark rights they occupy is more than other countries,so relatively developed countries tend to prohibit parallel import;Fifth,our country should first clearly allow the parallel import of trademark products,but for some trademark products of high technology and play a key role on our country's development should be clearly marked,prohibit it parallel import.