Research On Digital Product Pricing And Protection Strategy Based On Game Theory

With the revolution and progress of computer digital technology and mobile communication technology,the digital industry with information as the processing object has flourished in recent years.New product forms,communication methods and business forms have been created,bringing huge business opportunities to the digital industry.In recent years,with the rapid development of China's digital economy,the importance of digital product pricing in the digital economy has become increasingly prominent.However,how to achieve the integration,symbiosis and coordinated development of mature digital copyright company and small and medium-sized start-ups company is still an important challenge facing the industry.The research object of this thesis is a competitive market composed of two digital product companies: one is a mature copyright company with independent R?D technology copyright;the other is a newly-entered start-up company that does not have independent technology.Start-up company need to choose between infringement or legal purchase with a certain percentage of profit sharing to obtain copyright use rights.Considering on the basis of the duopoly digital product company's competitive market,we construct the Bertrand model and the Stackelberg model under the two choices of the start-up company's acquisition of copyright rights,and solve the optimal Nash equilibrium solution.Then,based on the assumption of fixed demand,this thesis makes a comparative analysis of the difference in pricing,demand,and profit between the two digital product companies when the startup company makes two choices.Finally,computational simulations are performed through assignment to analyze the impact of profit sharing ratio and network externality coefficients on the pricing,demand and profit of the two digital product companies.The analysis results show that the start-up company's choice of a certain profit sharing method to purchase copyright use rights is valid under certain circumstances.At this time,the profit of the start-up company and the copyright company will be higher than that of the infringement.At the same time,in the Bertrand and Stackelberg game models,the profit ratio that startups can accept is different.Under the Bertrand model,startups can accept a higher profit ratio than Stackelberg model competition.In other words,when the two companies make pricing decisions at the same time,the start-up company can accept a higher profit sharing ratio to purchase copyright usage rights to produce digital products.This provides new ideas and directions for protecting intellectual copyright and promoting the development of the digital industry.