Game Research On Supply Chain Of Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Freshness-Keeping Efforts With TPL Participation

With the improvement of people's living standards,consumers have higher requirements for quality of life.As a necessity for daily life,fresh produce is increasingly demanding for its quality and freshness.Fresh agricultural products are perishable products with characteristics of perishability,seasonality and regionality.In the process of circulation,higher preservation requirements are required.China's third-party logistics(TPL)development is relatively late,the comprehensive cold chain circulation rate is low,and the circulation loss is serious.Throughout the existing research on the supply chain of fresh agricultural products,most of them focus on the two-level or simple three-level supply chain,but less involved in the relatively complex three-level supply chain with TPL participation.Based on this perspective,this paper uses Stackelberg game theory to study the game problem of the three-level supply chain of fresh agricultural products consisting of one supplier,one TPL service provider and one retailer considering the TPL paying attention.First of all,this paper makes certain assumptions on the problems studied.Under the symmetry of fresh food supply chain preservation efforts,the three supply chain games in which supply suppliers,TPL service providers and retailers are dominant in the supply chain are established.The model,and using Stackelberg game theory to solve the optimal preservation effort level,wholesale price,retail price and optimal profit result in the three game models.On this basis,the results of the model are compared and analyzed to explore the relevant parameters and dominant advantages of the freshness-keeping efforts of different supply chain members under the dominant position.The optimal decision and optimal profit for the supply chain members under various game conditions.Impact.Secondly,aiming at the information asymmetry of the freshness-keeping efforts among members of the fresh agricultural product supply chain,we study the game model under the dominant position of suppliers,TPL service providers and retailers,and use Stackelberg game theory to solve three models separately.The optimal freshness-keeping effort level,optimal wholesale price,optimal retail price and optimal profit result of each member of the supply chain,to explore the phenomenon of TPL service providers concealing the level of freshness-keeping effort and the supply chain member enterprises at all levels The optimal decision and the impact of profit.By comparing and analyzing the results of the six game models before and after the analysis,the effects of the relevant parameters of the freshness-keeping effort level under the dominant position of different supply chain members on the optimal pricing and optimal profit of the supply chain members under various game conditions are analyzed.Studies have shown that TPL service providers conceal freshness-keeping effort level information does not affect the optimal wholesale price and retail price,but will reduce the level of freshness-keeping efforts,supplier profits,retailer profits,and the profit of TPL service providers led by suppliers.In the case of a rational TPL service provider will not choose to conceal the level of fresh effort efforts,it will truthfully announce its level of preservation efforts..Finally,this paper analyzes the parameter assignment of the model.The numerical results are compared between the three game models in which the different supply chain members are dominant.The basic quantity loss rate,the concealment coefficient under information asymmetry and the optimal decision result of each member are given.By analyzing and comparing the results of the example analysis,the inference of the level of preservation effort and the influence of information asymmetry on optimal pricing and optimal profit results is verified.