Research On Game And Incentive Mechanism Among Agents In The Evolution Of Low Carbon Economy

At present,with the rapid development of economy,the total energy demand in China increases rapidly.At the same time,with the the existence of a large number of energy-intensive enterprises,energy-extensive economic growth,irrational industrial structure,the total carbon emissions in China is increasing rapidly year by year.Thus the emission reduction pressure from home and abroad is also growing.In the face of climate change and the international carbon reduction pressure,the Chinese government undertake its responsibility initiatively.But as the environmental resources are shared resources,and the positive externalities of carbon reduction behavior.So the enterprises often don't have enough motivation to reduce carbon emission.In order to develop low-carbon economy,China has promulgated a series of environmental policy,and subsidy is one of the most commonly used policy measures,and has achieved remarkable performance.However,because of the information asymmetry between the various stakeholders,and their different interests' pursuit,it often occurs the local government inaction,chaos as,in particular the collusion between the local government and enterprises.Thus,it's important to study the behavior of the key agents and their different interests' pursuit,and design the incentive modes to find effective ways to restrict their decisions.Based on the classification and analysis of the current research literature of the low carbon economy,as well as considering the practical problem:the collusion between the local government and enterprises during the implementation of carbon subsidy policy,this thesis takes the central government,the local government,enterprises and non-governmental organization as the starting point,and uses the method of game theory,evolution game theory and the principal-agent etc.Firstly,it analyzes the behaviors of the main agents in the game.Then it builds the game models between central government and local government as well as local government and enterprises,and analyzes the mixed strategy Nash equilibriums.And an evolution game model between government,enterprises and non-governmental organization,and use the Matlab simulation software,to verify the validity of the model.Then,on the basis of the third chapter,it designs the incentive model for the local government's effort,as well as the enterprises.And a P-S-A three hierarchy model to prevent the collusion between the local government and enterprises.Finally,based on the analysis of the game models and incentive models,and the problems existing in the current low-carbon economy development,it puts forward several measures and policy recommendations from the three dimensions of the governmental level,the social level and the enterprise's level,in order to promote the development of the low-carbon economy and enrich its theory and policy research.The results indicates as follows:improving central government's inspection efficiency,decreasing inspection cost,heavier penalties,increasing the impact of reputation on local government and enterprises and increasing the camouflage cost of local government's fraud,help to restrict their behavior effectively.Therefore,the government should mature the supervision mechanism of the local government,and promote low-carbon technology innovation,improve the disclosure of environmental information and raise public's participation up.The media should undertake their social responsibility.Environmental NGO should actively participate in low-carbon development.Enterprises should strengthen the cultivation of the concept of low-carbon responsibility,and innovation of low-carbon technology.