A Study On The Signaling Game Among Carbon Market Players

Carbon market,as an effective measure for solving climate problem,has been recognized and applied worldwide.Researches on the carbon market are relatively abundant in which most of them are not suitable for China's national conditions or not carried on from the perspective of domestic carbon market in China.In this context,taking the domestic carbon market in China as research object,this article carries on the signaling game research.Firstly,trading process of carbon market is analyzed and transactions are classified based on different trading objects,places,and forms.Combined trading process with the predecessors' research,the main players in carbon market is extracted,and relationship between each pair of the main players are analyzed.Then,based on signal theory,indicators and signals are extracted from characteristics of the main players.The process of signal sending and transmission between the main players in carbon market is analyzed from the perspective of signal transmission and reception.According to the signal transmission process,game model of signal sender is built and equilibrium analysis is conducted for other three main players except for government.Replicator dynamical model of carbon-controlling enterprises and government is established.According to the stability theory of differential equation,the conditions required for replicator dynamical model to achieve evolutionary stable point are analyzed.Applying job market model to investors and voluntary projects of carbon reduction,and setting up different “belief” for investors,the conditions for reaching separating equilibrium is obtained.A tripartite game model is established for the Exchanges,investment participants and government to calculate the optimal action probability and analyze how the main players reduce action probability in order to improve the efficiency.Finally,according to the analysis results,suggestions for the development of the carbon market in China are put forward from the perspective of separation condition and incentive mechanism.