Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Airline’s Safety Information Report Based On Game Theory

During this period of change between old and new incidents,China’s civil aviation still has problems in safety information reporting,such as low level of understanding of incidents samples,low quality of information reporting,and untimely information reporting.Safety information is the foundation of civil aviation safety work.As an important collection channel of safety information,safety information reporting plays an important role in discovering safety hazards,controlling risks and preventing accidents.This paper first analyzes the current status of airline safety information reporting and finds that there are four problems.Based on the incentive status of airline safety information reporting,an evolutionary game model of airline safety supervision department and operation departments on safety information reporting is constructed.It was found that the evolutionary stability of the "supervision" strategy selected by the safety supervision department and the "report" strategy selected by the operating department could not be achieved in the case of only negative incentives,but the positive incentives could be improved.This result was verified by Matlab simulation.Then,in combination with the principal-agent theory,the incentive mechanism of the airline safety information reporting after the positive incentive was designed,and the following conclusions were obtained.In view of the opportunistic behaviors such as untrue reports and concealment in the airline safety information report,construct The incentive model of safety information reporting when there is no opportunistic behavior and opportunistic behavior is found.Through the comparison of the model results and the analysis of numerical examples,it is found that improving the incentive intensity of the safety supervision department for the operating departments and the cost coefficient of the opportunistic behavior of the operating departments can be weakened.Opportunistic behavior.Aiming at the problem of unimplemented credit management in airline safety information reporting,combined with reputation theory,an incentive model for airline safety information reporting that does not consider reputation effects and considers reputation effects is constructed.After analyzing the examples,it is found that considering the reputation effect can effectively improve the incentive effect on the safety information reporting.In order to avoid collusion and concealment between the operating departments,combined with the prospect theory,a collusion between the operating departments was constructed to conceal the report from the safety supervision department game model,through the model after analyzing the cases discussed,numerical found psychological factors are important factors affecting conspiracy,the probability of collusion between the department run by conspiring with increased penalties reduced and so on.Combined with the analysis results of the above airline safety information reporting incentive model,this article proposes to establish and improve the safety information reporting reward and punishment system,strengthen the company’s internal safety information reporting climate,and improve the safety supervision department’s operation suggested measures such as the supervision and restraint mechanism of the department,the improvement of the information disclosure system of the safety incident information reporting,and the improvement of the reputation evaluation system of the safety information reporting of the operating department.