Research On Supervision System Modeling And Economic Effect Of SOE’s Manager

Chinese state-owned enterprises health and long-term development is crucial to Chinese economic. To make Chinese economic rapid development, we must improve the operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises, and reduce the speculative behavior of managers. In recent years, the continuous emergence of corruption in state-owned enterprises has a great relationship with the supervision mechanism of state owned enterprises. Establish and improve the system for punishing and preventing corruption of state-owned enterprise, and strengthen the state-owned enterprise party style and clean government and anti-corruption work, supervision is the key. How to give full play to the supervisory role is to effectively safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of enterprise employees, and prevent the loss of state assets, corruption problems, ensure the need of the social stability and healthy development of the state-owned enterprises, but also is an important theoretical and realistic problem to the current reform of state-owned enterprises.At present, the supervision mechanism of SOE mainly includes external and internal supervision. According to the state-owned operator easily induced corruption,inadequate supervision, supervision is not in place, the paper research on how to supervise the speculation of SOE managers and ensure the long-term healthy development of SOE. Under the principal-agent framework, according to the characteristics of the SOE’s supervision and punishment mechanism, the thesis analyze and describe the principal-agent relationship between the managers,principals and supervisors, and the game process among them and researching on the economic effect of SOE under the different type supervision model, according to establishing the dual reputation model, and reaching on system modeling of the double principal-agent theory modeling. Then,it has very important significance to the long-term development, to promote the SOE operator health growth, to reduce agency conflicts in state-owned enterprises, to deepe the reform of SOE governance structure.