| In the early1990s, China respectively in Shanghai and Shenzhen established Securities Exchange and continued to expand the scale of the Capital Market. The development of the China’s securities exchange in the more than20years, from no rules and regulations to the preliminary formation of the basic laws, from manual to paperless operation, has made gratifying progress. This undoubtedly become the main concern in China’s economic transition process. Meanwhile, how to develop China’s capital market stably, efficiently and sustainablely should be paid more attention.The essence of the capital market is to allocate the resource reasonablely and the information is the main element in the whole market. Timely, accurate, complete and sufficient information disclosure establishes the foundation of people’s confidence about securities exchange. As a kind of information transmission mechanism, the goal of information disclosure is to transmit company’s information to capital market. Thus, the investor can form reasonable expectation and establish the investment confidence, in turn, allocating resource reasonably in capital market will come true. As a result, information disclosure is the cornerstone in capital market. However, in modern capital market, low quality of accounting information disclosure as well as low transparency of accounting information is a universal phenomenon, which brings severe consequences and impact to the capital market and even the whole society. When we expose highfalutin achievement and break gorgeous rings, we find some shocking criminal facts, reckless illegal body, unprecedented fraud means and wanton illicit operations. In recent years, some accounting fraud scandals such as Enron and WorldCom took place in the western mature capital market, which made investors distrust the listed company at some time. Because of the economic system’s transition and imperfect information disclosure mechanism, it appears endless accounting scandals in China Capital Market, such as Hongguang industrial’s fraudulent listed (1997), Hainan Minyuan Modern Agriculture Development’s big hoax in stock market (1998), false disclosure of Zheng Baiwen (2000), illusory Ying Guangxia (2002) and the like. Besides, due to dilatory information disclosure and false statement, many corporations are placed on file for investigation and punished in public by CSRC, for instance, Chongqing International Enterprise Investment (2005). ST Kelon (2006), China Fangda Group (2006), Hongxiao Steel Structure (2007), ST Shengda (2007), Sanmao Industrial (2008), ST Sihuan (2009), CEC Corecast (2009), Zhonghong Holding (2010), ST Far East (2010), Jiangsu Sanyou Group (2011), Keda Group and so on. In addition, National Audit Office issued an audit report in June1st, which set off the audit storm and put many national enterprises into trouble. For example,"two barrels of oil" less profit2.75billion Yuan, China Coal Group more profit55.1376million Yuan, ICBC illegal loans11billion Yuan and so on.Now, the most important task of securities market is how to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure, let public investors who are in disadvantageous situation get useful information and make investors trust listed company. If listed company always discloses some unnecessary information, the quality of accounting information will gradually go down. What’s more, investors will lose the trust of information which is disclosed by listed company and the confidence of securities market, then, the cornerstone of the whole securities market will no longer exist. High quality of accounting information disclosure is closely related to investors’profit, orderly development of China securities market. This thesis which analyses the effect of internal and external supervision mechanism on accounting information disclosure and introduces some suggestions and countermeasures about improving accounting information’s quality combined with China’s current situation is based on many related literatures and theories of accounting information disclosure. This thesis mainly consists of five parts. Firstly, there is an introduction, which briefly introduces the research background, research significance, current situation at home and abroad, research contents, research methods and some innovative points of the article. Secondly, the study has laid solid theoretical foundation by analyzing relative theories of accounting information disclosure’s quality and supervision. Thirdly, it analyses accounting information disclosure and supervision status of China listed company. Fourthly, it focuses on the effect of internal and external supervision mechanism’s status on accounting information disclosure’s quality. Internal supervision mechanism adopts empirical research method, while external supervision mechanism adopts game theory. Fifthly, it puts forward some suggestions and countermeasures to improve China accounting information disclosure from two respects of internal and external supervision mechanism, which is based on the above analysis.This thesis mainly adopts normative research, empirical study and game theory. Normative research mainly manifests the summary of theories in the second part and the analysis of accounting information disclosure’s quality and supervision status in the third part. Empirical research is mainly reflected the effects of internal supervision mechanism on accounting information disclosure’s quality in the fourth part. The article studies how the status of internal supervision mechanism influences the quality of company information disclosure by analyzing206Shenzhen A-shares manufacturing data. Game theory is mainly reflected the effects of external supervision mechanism on accounting information disclosure’ quality. The article constructs three different game models and respectively analyzes the game process between accounting information disclosure’s quality and listed company of CSRC, accounting firm, and creditors. |
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