Font Size: a A A

Research On The Supervision Of Project Invested By Government Based On Principal-Agent Theory

Posted on:2012-02-29Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z Q LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2219330362454257Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the high-speed development of our country's economy, the government has increased the investment of projects. Especially after the financial crisis of 2008, the projects that contain water projects, highway and other important infrastructure projects invested by our government have got further development. With series characters including long construction period, huge investment and so on, the construction status and operation conditions of these projects invested by government will influent the infrastructure construction of our economy, these has become the focus of some related government departments. Instead of participating the construction and operation of these projects, the government select the mode of principle-agent. The principal must supervise the agent as it still exist asymmetric information between the principal and the agent in the projects invested by government. This paper does researches of the relation between the principal and the agent of projects invested by government, and proposes better mechanism of supervision, management and incentive.On the basis of the research of lots literature about the supervision and incentive of principal-agent at home and abroad, this paper has analysis the characters of governmental investment, the supervision mechanism and management mode adopted by government, the relation between principal and agent and the current situation of management in detail. Then on the basis of the traditional model of the principal-agent and introduction of the incentive of sharing the remaining net output, this paper established the special principal-agent model which is suit for the large- projects invested by government with the problems and the causes of these problem that exist in the large-projects invested by our government. Finally, this paper designed the mechanism of regulatory constraints and incentive about the principal and the agent in the projects invested by government to meet the needs of increasing the social benefits and economic benefits of these projects.This thesis enriches the application of principal-agent model, increases the supervision level of the projects invested by government by researching the regulatory constraints and incentive of these projects, which plays an important role and has great research value and practical meaning for promoting the development of the projects invested by our government.
Keywords/Search Tags:principal-agent theory, projects invested by government, supervision mechanism, incentive mechanism, symmetric information
PDF Full Text Request
Related items