The governance structures for spectrum uses: A comparative analysis of exclusive and commons models

A consensus has been formed among economists, lawyers and engineers that the traditional command-and-control model was inefficient. Nevertheless, there are sharp disagreements about the best approach to liberalize spectrum use. Property rights advocates believe that licensees should be authorized flexible and exclusive rights. On the contrary, commons advocates claim that diverse wireless systems can coexist within the same band provided there are appropriate governing rules. This dissertation compares the governance structure of the exclusive and commons models, proposes the institutional requirements for a sustainable commons and explains the rationale for striking a balance between the two models.;This research develops a three-layered framework for spectrum management based on Ostrom's theory of common-pool resource management and Hazlett's theory of the vertical structure of spectrum regulation. Using the framework, this research proposes the institutional requirements that must be met for a sustainable spectrum commons. Having learned a lesson from the inefficient command-and-control spectrum management, it is very important to keep the minimal role of government regulation of the commons model and make the rules adaptive to technological development. The governance structures should allow the parties best capable of determining the income flow of spectrum uses to participate in rulemaking, and also maintain sustainable responsiveness to new technologies by leaving enough room for users to develop their specific network rules.;This research also clarifies the divergence between the exclusive and commons model using the three-layered framework, especially who having what rights to manage the spectrum bands to what extent. In addition, the research explains the rationale for the institutional arrangements. The exclusive model delegates a licensee exclusion rights to manage all the attributes, which mitigates uncertainties stemming from harmful interference and encourages investment in large scale ubiquitous systems. But the model is hostile to short range technologies that do not fit in their profit pattern or the existing rules. In contrast, the commons model only roughly defines rules of some attributes and leaves undefined attributes in the public domain. The non-exclusive arrangements make it easy for deployment of innovative short range technologies. Diverse parties that have comparative advantages in identifying local radio conditions could make use of these attributes with minimal barriers. But the commons model has difficulty to accommodate ubiquitous networks. Each spectrum model has its strengths and weaknesses, and one model does not fit all applications. It is important to strike a balance between the exclusive and commons models in accordance with the technical characteristics of the specific applications.