A Study On The Rural Public Goods Supply In The Background Of The "One Case,One Meeting" System

The supply of rural public goods is related to the rural construction,the development of agriculture,the improvement of the living standards of farmers,the integration of urban and rural development,and the realization of the "Building a moderately prosperous society " strategy.The rural public goods include basic public service products,as well as village level public goods.The latter is generally referred to as village level public welfare undertakings because of its use and consumption being limited to rural community.After the exemption of agricultural tax,the former were supplied by financial capital,while the supply of the latter were upon "one case,one meeting" system,with "case" meaning village level public goods,and "meeting"the process of cooperative game between villagers.So the "one case,one meeting"system is a spontaneous collective action among villagers,the incentives and constraints of the system guiding behaviors of villagers and village cadres who are the principal part of collective action.Only when cooperation among villagers realized as well as cadres' enthusiasm fou project construction aroused can bring about village-level pubic goods supply.In the context of "one case,one meeting" implemented from 2000 to 2008,the thesis pointed out:the village collective action dilemma led to low proportion of villages constructing public goods through the system.To solve this problem,the State began to provide financial awards and subsidy and strengthen the assessment of village cadres from 2008.Afterwards,we witnessed the dilemma cracked partly,and the proportion soared.So the system was called "one case,one meeting" with the support of financial awards and subsidy by academics,this thesis called it "new one case,one meeting" for short.As a basic system concerning village-level pubic goods supply,its working mechanism of motivating villagers and cadres was analyzed theoretically.Besides,the thesis proposed policy recommendation to better facilitate collective action and village public goods supply.Based on data from 203 villages in Fujian Province,theoretical analysis on the existing studies and empirical analysis on cooperative games among villagers and cadres' conduct constitute the main part of the thesis.Research methods and conclusions are as follows:First,by analyzing system motivation and villagers'collective action by means of game theory,the phenomenon was found that even if villagers were responsible for only 30%of the total cost of project construction,as long as the financial rewards and subsidy were seen as non-discriminatory to all,villagers in administrative village with a large population were reluctant to cooperate.Whereas,if financial rewards were seen as selective incentive to villagers in natural village,the initiative of natural village's constructing public welfare project was aroused firstly,then it will actively coordinate the interests of other natural villages,which eventually realize cooperation among all villagers.Second,empirical analysis on factors influencing village cadres' behavior were carried out by multiple regression.It was found that new performance appraisal system on village cadres and effective election mechanism had significant influence on cadres' enthusiasm,which means they devote more time to village public goods construction.The article also pointed out that the reason why some villages haven't taken collective action with the same system may related to their unique characteristic,which may have impact on behavior of villagers and cadres,thereby affecting the village public goods supply.Thus,this thesis analyzed the influence village characteristic have on the village public goods supply by Poisson regression.It is found that villages with large population and large number of natural villages in specific administrative scope prone to bring about collective action and more public goods.The results also imply that villages with small population have disadvantage on public goods supply.The thesis might have some innovation in the following areas:First,the financial reward and subsidy with the new "one case,one meeting" system are discriminatory motivation towards specific villagers rather than non-discriminatory to all villagers,which means the "selective motivation"indirectly produce cooperation among administrative village.Second,village characteristics such as population and natural village numbers in a specific administrative village have positive influence on village-level public goods supply,rather than negative influence as other researchers proposed.