Collective Action Of Public Goods Provision

This article finds a public product that can truly reflect people's wishes: property maintenance funds.We use it as the object of study,through theoretical deduction and the empirical results of micro economic data of Shenzhen properties special maintenance fund,to test weather there is a correlation between people's collective action and the group size.Through our research,we found that there is indeed a complex relationship between the group size and the collective action of voluntary providing public goods.From the perspective of property maintenance funds,this paper examines the influencing factors of collective action,with particular emphasis on the impact of group size on collective action.Based on the panel data of Shenzhen properties special maintenance fund in 2009-2015,this paper investigates the factors that influence the use of special maintenance funds by the house owners.In this paper,we study the impact of different factors on the collective action of the owners from the number of residents per floor,the total number of buildings,and the elevator.Finally,it comes to the conclusion that the influence of group size on collective action does exist,and indeed it is a nonlinear one.The first chapter is introduction.This chapter mainly introduces the background of this topic and the significance of this topic.With the increasing number of people buying commercial housing,the maintenance and repair of public parts of housing has gradually become a concern.At present,there are many problems in the property maintenance funds,such as the total amount of property maintenance funds in our country is huge and the procedures are complicated.However,because of the use of the property need the owners' voting decisions,so the owners' wishes for the public goods can be truly expressed.In this way,it becomes a good research object for us to study people's collective actions.Especially in the case of expanding collective size,weather the collective action of voluntary provision of public goods will be affected,which is an important topic of our concern.We first put forward the status and problems of property maintenance funds.Second,we define the concept of public maintenance fund.Third,we discuss the purpose and method,the content and the logical framework of this paper.Finally,we propose the main innovation points of this paper.The second chapter is literature review.On the basis of literature research at home and abroad,this paper reviews the relevant literature of public maintenance fund,the relevant literature about collective action and free riding,as well as the related research of public goods.After that,this paper reviews the related literature from four aspects:voluntary supply of public goods,group size,collective action returns,and collective heterogeneity.Especially,this paper reviews from the threshold mechanism ofnon-return point and the non-monotonic effects of the group size on collective action.The third chapter is the review of the development process of China's property maintenance funds,which highlights the public goods attributes of China's property maintenance funds.First of all,this paper combed the relevant provisions of China's housing,as well as China's relevant provisions of public housing and commodity housing.Secondly,this paper takes the time context as the clue to analyze the process of the formation and evolution of the property maintenance funds in China,and to evaluate the problems and achievements in different stages of the development process.From the development process of property maintenance funds in our country,the property maintenance funds have been provided to provide funds for a part of the building and public facilities.From the use of property maintenance funds,we can examine the collective actions of the owners in the provision of public goods.The fourth chapter is the development and present situation of the special maintenance fund in Shenzhen,and introduces the relevant policies and regulations of Shenzhen property maintenance fund.First of all,the article focuses on the relevant factors that affect the property maintenance funds from the perspective of Shenzhen:one is the maintenance fund of the house itself,the second is the total cost of building construction project.In the actual payment and use of property maintenance funds,they affect the development and the amount of special maintenance funds in Shenzhen.Next,the article introduced the allocation regulation of Shenzhen special maintenance fund,as well as in the old district quarters,which shows the characteristics of providing public goods.Finally,the article examines the present situation of Shenzhen property maintenance funds.The fifth chapter is data description and empirical research.First of all,the article introduces the data source and statistical description.It mainly introduces the collection and arrangement of the data of the special maintenance fund in Shenzhen,the selection of relevant variables,the meaning,and the statistical description.Secondly,it is the empirical research on the influencing factors of collective action.In this empirical part,we use two different empirical models to empirically analyze the use of property maintenance funds in Shenzhen.In order to determine the impact of owners on the use of property maintenance funds,That is to examine their participation in collective action factors.We use the empirical analysis focuses on the five variables,which describe the affect of the owners using the property maintenance funds: residential number(jmsbd),residential number square of each floor in one building(jmsb2d),the number of each building floor number maximum(max),whether a building has an elevator(maxh7),the year from the establishment of the building to the year of the property maintenance fund used(dyear).First,we use two value model to analyze whether the owners use the property maintenance funds.With Shenzhen property maintenance funds of 2009-2015,we respectively study the five factors to influence whether the owners use the property maintenance fund,finallyfound a factor is not significant.After that,this paper uses the interception model to study the extent to which each factor affects the amount of the owner's maintenance funds.In the empirical regression,this paper first examines the whole sample,then divides it into five types: commercial buildings and residential buildings,high-rise buildings and low rise buildings,as well as the fifth building(which could be commercial building and residential buildings).This paper focuses on the collective actions of residential building owners and collective actions of commercial owners.At the same time,it also examines the factors affecting the collective actions of pure residential owners,pure commercial owners and the owner of the fifth building.Finally,it is found that the owners' use of property maintenance funds is affected by the collective size.For residential owners,regardless of the size of their group,they are able to coordinate and participate in collective action,which shows that they can agree on the use of property maintenance funds.This is because,in the case of repeated games,everyone's best strategy is to choose cooperation,that is,to agree to use the property maintenance funds.Through the deduction of the repeated game model,it is also proved that the collective actions of the house owners are independent of the group size.For the owners of commercial buildings,they provide a clear inverted U-shaped curve between the collective actions of the public goods provision and population size.For the high-rise buildings owners and commercial building owners,they also use the property maintenance funds in a non-linear relationship with the number of residents.Specifically,the number of residents per building is a positive correlation with the group size,and the square shows negative correlation.Those reflect an inverted U-shaped curve.And through the asymmetric information of the game,we analyze the free rider in the commercial owner from the game model.It also validates the results of related experiments in experimental economics.: that the proportion of voluntary provision of public goods was consistent with our empirical results.The sixth chapter is conclusions and policy recommendations.Therefore,for residential owners,they voluntarily provide public goods.So there is no "free rider" exists,we can transfer of the managing right of using property maintenance funds to the owners' Congress.It is precisely because the collective action of the residential owners has nothing to do with the size of the group,so we then examine the owners of self-provision and management of public goods management model.In the case of self-management of the owners of the General Assembly,a number of cities have achieved good results,namely: Suzhou,Jiangsu Yangzhou,Shenzhen,Nanning,Beijing.There is a free rider in the commercial owners,so it can not be managed by the owner.At the end of this paper,policy recommendations are given.