Performance Of Government Purchasing Old-age Care Services

With the increasing aging of the population,the demand for old-age services has been increasing.The government of our country pays more and more attention to the purchase of old-age service,and the top level design of the related system is constantly improved.Moreover,governments at all levels have invested heavily in the purchase of old-age care services.Taking Wuhan as an example,the government's fiscal expenditure for purchasing old-age services in 2015,2016 and 2017 was 67.325 million yuan,70.205 million yuan,and 84.145 million yuan respectively.The growth rates in 2016 and 2017 were 4.28 % and 19.88 % respectively.Then,whether the government has achieved the policy goal to purchase the old-age service,whether it has met the needs of the elderly,and what needs to be improved in the implementation,it is urgent to make clear through the performance evaluation of the government purchase of the old-age service.However,the local government's evaluation of the performance of the government in purchasing pension services is still in its initial stage of development.It is also basically separate.The relevant policy provisions are very general,and the evaluation standards,methods and indicators system are not sound.The General Office of the State Council's Guiding Opinions on the Government's Purchase of Services from Social Forces,the Circular on Doing a Good Job in the Government's Purchase of Old-Age Services and other policy documents require strengthening the performance evaluation of the government's purchase of old-age services,and paying attention to the satisfaction evaluation of the elderly service recipients.In this context,this article takes Wuhan institution old-age service as an example,trying to answer three core questions: 1.Why should the performance of the government in purchasing old-age services be evaluated? 2.How to evaluate the performance of the government in purchasing old-age service? 3.What is the government's performance in purchasing pension services? 4.What are the ways to improve government procurement of old-age services?From the three research questions above,the content of this paper can be divided into four parts and eight specific chapters.The first part is the introduction,mainly answers the research question 1 mentioned above.This part puts forward the background and significance of this research,and puts forward the ideas and innovations of this research based on the contributions and shortcomings of previous research achievements;The second part consists of chapters I to IV,which mainly answer the research question 2 mentioned above.This part discusses the theoretical basis,realistic basis and foreign experience of the evaluation of the performance evaluation of the government's old-age service,and then constructs the evaluation index system of the government's institutional old-age service,and carries out research and design in the light of the actual situation of the institutional old-age service in Wuhan;The third part consists of the fifth,sixth and seventh chapters,and answers the research question 3 above by empirical research.These three chapters take Wuhan institution's old-age service as an example,analyze the fairness of resources allocation,efficiency of government's old-age service,and the Service quality of institutional old-age care.From the three dimensions of fairness,efficiency and effectiveness respectively.The government does not directly produce services in the purchase of institutional old-age services,but provides them through the transmission mechanism of old-age institutions.Therefore,the evaluation of the results of the government's purchase of institutional old-age services must be reflected by the evaluation of the quality of institutional old-age services produced by old-age institutions.The evaluation of the quality of institutional old-age service can make up for the shortcomings of the evaluation of equity and efficiency;The fourth part is the eighth chapter,which answers the above question 4,that is,summarizes the main research conclusions of this study,and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.In this paper,we study the fairness of resource allocation in the process of government procurement of old-age care services by using the Theil index and Gini coefficient.Using DEA evaluation method,this paper analyzes the efficiency of old-age services purchased by Wuhan municipal government.Based on the perceptual service quality theory,the service quality evaluation scale of the design institution for the elderly is used to evaluate the service quality of the institutions in Wuhan,and the influence of the government purchasing service expenditure on the service quality of institutions for the elderly is discussed by regression analysis method.Finally,the paper discusses the countermeasures to improve the performance of institutional old-age services.It is found that:1.Based on stakeholder theory,public goods supply theory and other theories of government purchasing old-age services,and drawing lessons from the experience of the UK and Australian governments in the performance evaluation of institutional old-age services,Wuhan city is taken as an example to construct the performance evaluation index system of government purchasing institutional old-age services.2.Using DEA evaluation method,this paper analyzes the efficiency of old-age services purchased by Wuhan municipal government.The result shows that the comprehensive technical efficiency of the municipal government of Wuhan is at a high level,and the difference between districts is not obvious.The comprehensive technical efficiency of purchasing institutional old-age services in the central urban districts is lower than that in suburb districts.Good economic development and more government investment do not surely lead to high efficiency.Of the six administrative regions,there are 2 districts with constant scale remuneration,1 district with increasing scale remuneration,and 3 districts with decreasing scale compensation.3.When studying the quality of institutional old-age service in Wuhan,it was found that the overall quality of institutional old-age service was not high,and 58 % of institutions scored lower than the overall average.The quality of institutional old-age care services needs to be improved in terms of reliability,and there are great differences in terms of reliability,reliability and visibility.Direct government investment has no significant impact on the quality of institutional old-age care.The government's bed subsidy has a significant positive impact on the service quality of institutions.Under the control of other variables,each additional number of subsidized beds will increase the overall score of institutional service quality evaluation by 0.001.The main innovations of this article are:1.It has improved the performance evaluation index system of the government purchasing old-age services.Scholars such as Bao Guoxian,Zhang Xiaoyi and Ji Peng set up a performance evaluation index system for the government to purchase old-age care services at home.Taking Wuhan institution as an example,this paper constructs the performance evaluation index system of institutional old-age service purchased by the government.Together with previous researches,a complete evaluation system of the performance of the government in purchasing old-age care services was formed.2.Based on the perceptual service quality theory,using the SERVPERF scale,the survey scale for the evaluation of old-age service quality of was designed.It provides an operational tool for practical workers to evaluate the quality of old-age service of institutions.3.In the study of the quality of institutional old-age service in Wuhan,it is found that the direct investment of government has no significant impact on institutional old-age service quality,while the government's bed subsidy for institutions has significant positive impact on institutional old-age service quality.This provides a basis for the government to change the way it buys institutional old-age services.