| Since the implementation of the electric power system reform in 2002,China has fundamentally changed the mandatory planning system,the separation of government and enterprise,the separation of power plants and networks,and initially formed a diversified competition pattern for the main body of the electric power market.In order to further improve the efficiency of power operation and reduce the cost of power generation,China has carried out a series of policies and measures to promote the reform process,such as the competitive bidding pilot project,the pilot transaction between large users and power generation enterprises,and the priority of renewable energy connection.In 2015,the document ?Several Opinions on Further Deepening the Reform of Electric Power System‘ clearly put forward the structure of electric power system reform of ?Take control of the middle and let go of both ends‘.As the focus and path of this reform,the three ?orderly liberalization‘ points out the direction for realizing power market-oriented reform,promoting fair competition and energy-saving and environmental protection.With the further advancement of reform,the development of China’s power market is facing new challenges,which are mainly divided into three aspects.Firstly,with the increasing progress of competitive auction,the diversity of power participants appears.Because of the participation of small and medium-sized power generation enterprises,power auction is becoming more and more frequent,and the amounts of generators participating in the auction is increasing sharply.On the other hand,demand side is more sensitive to electricity price because of the liberalization of user’s option.The changes on both sides of supply and demand make it difficult to analyze the behavior of generators,forecast the equilibrium price of electricity and government regulation.Secondly,the market of direct power purchase by large consumers is not very active and there is no price mechanism suitable for direct power purchase.With the promotion of policies and the change of consumers’ preferences for electricity purchase,upstream power generation enterprises are encouraged to invade the retail electricity market to expand market demand and obtain more profits.The change of the traditional channel of purchasing electricity(such as power generation enterprises-grid enterprises-users)has had an impact on the profit distribution,bargaining power and pricing strategy between the power grid enterprises and the power generation enterprises.Therefore,it is important to understand the tripartite game relationship among power generation enterprises,power grid enterprises and large users,to study the reasons for the emergence of "cheap electricity" in direct-power purchase channel and the low enthusiasm of direct power purchase.Finally,there is a growing gap in financial subsidies for renewable energy development.At present,China continues to implement benchmark electricity prices,i.e.FIT subsidies,which are classified according to different renewable energy varieties in four regions.Despite the rapid development of renewable energy in China under the incentive of subsidies,it has resulted in large amount of financial gaps.How to innovate the subsidy which can reduce the fiscal deficit while stimulating the development of renewable energy power generation industry has not been effectively solved.Based on the background of electric power system reform and the relevant knowledge of auction theory,game theory and incentive theory,this paper systematically analyses the game behavior among electric power participants,studies the influence mechanism between pricing strategy and equilibrium price of power market,and puts forward effective ways to promote the development of electric power trading market.This paper is of great significance to promote the reform of electricity trading market and the expansion of related theoretical research.The research work,conclusions and innovations of this paper are mainly embodied in the following three aspects:(1)The bidding model of electricity market under demand elasticity is constructed.By applying the game theory,this paper establishes a multi-unit electricity bidding model and reveals the bidding mechanism under the unified market clearing price auction rule based on elastic demand.By introducing the standardized bidding price,the bidding price-quantity pair of power producers is normalized,and the unique Nash equilibrium in the market is obtained according to the marginal cost of private generation,the number of power producers and the electricity demand.In addition,we discuss the influence of uncertain elastic demand on power market efficiency through comparative analysis.It is concluded that even under the competitive conditions,there is still the behavior of utilizing market power to increase equilibrium electricity price among generators,which leads to the rise of market electricity price and the decline of social welfare.But compared with the inelastic demand auction,the elastic demand auction is an effective way to restrain the power producers from exercising their market power.The model provides decision support for bidding strategy of power suppliers,and points out the direction for improving market efficiency and forecasting market price of power industry.(2)Under the background of direct power purchase,this paper reveals the price game mechanism between power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises.Under the dual-channel power purchase supply chain,the optimal pricing strategy of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises is studied when the demand of large users is uncertain,and the equilibrium price of large user market is analyzed.From the point of view of power supply chain,a sequential competitive game model of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises is constructed.Market price and information flow affect each other through strategic pricing.In addition,we deeply study the impact of large user preferences and channel competition on pricing and supply chain efficiency.The results show that the power grid enterprises have the motivation to manipulate the information flow and distort the market pricing.The current low price of direct purchasing power comes from the low retail price affected by cross subsidies and the small scale of direct purchasing power channel market.With the expansion of direct purchasing power market,power generation enterprises will increase market power,but excessive occupation of power grid enterprises’ market will lead to distorted supply chain pricing.The model provides decision support for the optimal pricing strategy of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises,and provides direction and policy guidance for the development of direct power purchase by large users in China..(3)This paper proposes a cost-related price compensation mechanism based on UCP auction,and proves its effectiveness and incentive compatibility.Considering the intermittent,uncertain and high operating costs of renewable energy generation,as well as the strategic bidding behavior and possible moral hazards of generators,the model constructs an optimal incentive mechanism for renewable energy generation based on principal-agent model,and solves the problem through a continuous time stochastic optimal control method.The price compensation mechanism based on the unified clearing price auction includes two parts: unit generation compensation and potential threat.Compared with fixed price subsidies,cost-related price compensation mechanism can effectively reduce the national fiscal deficit.The proposed subsidy mechanism and its extension provide decision support for renewable energy policy design,and also provide a theoretical framework for the study of information asymmetry in renewable energy power generation market. |
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