Research Of Incentive And Supervision Mechanism To Engineer Based On The Information Asymmetry

In recent years, inspect grain industry developed fast. However, there’s thephenomenon that a lot of engineer do not work hard and collude with the contractorsbecause the supervision fee is lower. Author referred to some study of the domestic andforeign scholars, with asymmetric information theory, agency theory, game theory andmanagement and incentive theory as the foundation, using literature and survey,qualitative and quantitative analysis methods, and deriving mathematical model,supplemented by information economics analysis and hierarchy analysis method studybehavior of engineer.Based on the theory and analysis of practice, paper designed reasonable supervisionand incentive system to the engineer from two aspects of the quality supervision andincentive mechanism.Researched on supervision from engineer on the engineering quality, paper analyzedmorality risk faced with by engineer from two aspects of lazy problem and collusion，and done game analysis between owner and engineer in the two situations.Then paper researched incentive question to engineer from dominant incentive andimplicit incentive. To the research of dominant incentive mechanism, author came upwith the optimal incentive contract model, analyzed dominant incentive mechanism tothe engineer, and got that owners should plan incentive mechanism from contract, madebenefit of engineer and owners conform, made engineer bear a part of risk, engineercould serve project well and work hard for owners. To the lower wages of engineer, itoffered optimized salary system. To the research of implicit incentive mechanism, thispaper focused on the analysis of reputation incentive, and it put forward double famemechanism of engineer industry. Because they were supplementing each other, so couldproduce incentive function to engineer.Finally, paper analyzed how owner supervised engineer from the two aspects ofpreventing lazy and collusion through the example. Analysis showed that preventinglazy mechanism of owner is very strict, but there are still shortcomings. Preventingcollusion mechanism is weaker, and investigative capability of owner is not strong, alsoneed to be improved.