Executive Equity Incentive,Stock Price Collapse Risk And Information Disclosure Quality

Our capital market started relatively late,the related supporting system still needs to be perfected,the information asymmetry is relatively high,the investment bodies are mainly individual investors,so it is easy for our capital market to have stock price crashes.Stock price crash will lead to the rapid evaporation of shareholder wealth,seriously damage the interests of small and medium investors,is not conducive to the healthy development of the capital market.how to effectively curb the risk of stock price crash has aroused extensive attention in the academic circle.Most scholars believe that principal-agent and information asymmetry are the main causes of stock price crash risk.When the negative information intentionally hidden by the management for personal gain reaches a certain limit and can no longer be hidden,it will be released into the market and induce stock price crash.In recent years,stock price crash events caused by financial fraud occurred frequently.Senior executives are the decision-makers of corporate information disclosure.Executive equity incentive,as an effective way to alleviate agency problems,has not achieved the expected effect although the implementation scale has been expanding,so whether it has an impact on the stock price crash risk? What role does the quality of information disclosure play in the relationship between them?Based on this,this thesis adopts the method of combining theoretical analysis and empirical test,and selects the relevant data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2021 as samples to study the relationship between equity incentive of senior executives and stock price crash risk.Moreover,based on the role of executive equity incentives on the quality of information disclosure,this thesis explores the role of the quality of information disclosure in the relationship between the two.The thesis further analyzes the moderating effects of non-controlling shareholders’ withdrawal threat and different property rights on their relationship.Research results:(1)There is a significant positive correlation between the intensity of executive equity incentive and the risk of stock price crash,and the implementation of executive equity incentive will increase the risk of stock price crash.(2)There is a significant positive correlation between executive equity incentive and the quality of corporate information disclosure,which negates the mediating role of information disclosure quality in the correlation between executive equity incentive and stock price crash risk.(3)The quality of corporate information disclosure will inhibit the adverse impact of executive equity incentive on stock price crash risk.(4)The withdrawal threat of non-controlling major shareholders will weaken the adverse impact of executive equity incentive on stock price collapse risk.(5)In state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between executive equity incentive and stock price crash risk is more significant.Starting from the negative effect of executive equity incentive on corporate governance,this thesis explores its impact on stock price crash risk,and includes variables such as the quality of information disclosure,the withdrawal threat of non-controlling major shareholders and the heterogeneity of property rights into the study of the two,enriching the research on influencing factors of stock price crash risk,the economic consequences of information disclosure quality and the governance role of the withdrawal threat of non-controlling major shareholders.The implementation effect of executive equity incentive is clarified.The results of this thesis provide theoretical support for Chinese capital market to strengthen financial risk control,improve executive equity incentive system,listed companies to prevent stock price crash risk,strengthen investor supervision,and promote investors’ rational investment.