Research On The Mechanism Of Non-Controlling Major Shareholders’ Participation In Governance Affecting Stock Price Information Content Of Listed Companies

Under the background of "double cycle" economic development,enterprises,as the basic carrier of economic activities,play an extremely important role in accelerating the formation of"domestic cycle".In order to realize the sustainable development of enterprises,the Chinese government proposes to better serve the real economy by giving play to the "hub role" of the capital market.The key to the "hub role" of capital market lies in the realization of its function of social resource allocation.It is a necessary condition for capital market to realize price discovery and improve resource allocation efficiency to enhance the information content of stock price of listed companies.However,for a long time,the imbalance of internal governance mechanism brought by the "centralization" of ownership and the "collectivism" of control has highlighted the problems of insufficient innovation and distortion of information disclosure of Chinese enterprises,which has seriously affected the operation efficiency of the capital market.The participation of non-controlling major shareholders in corporate governance is an important measure to further improve corporate governance mechanism.By actively participating in corporate governance practices,non-controlling major shareholders can effectively supervise the internal interest subjects of enterprises,thus influencing corporate behavior and applying it to the capital market.Then,is it necessary for non-controlling major shareholders to participate in corporate governance?Apart from the direct supervision of "voting by hand",is there any other way or means for non-controlling major shareholders to participate in corporate governance?What is its theoretical basis?Can non-controlling maj or shareholders’ participation in governance effectively improve the information content of stock price of listed companies?If so,what are the underlying mechanisms and pathways?What factors will have a different impact on the relationship between non-controlling major shareholders’ participation in governance and stock price information content?In-depth study and answer the above questions,not only helps to correct evaluation of non-controlling large shareholders to participate in,the relationship between governance and shares the information content and to realize the "financial services in the real economy" the goal of a new round of financial reform,to promote our country enterprise "quality development" and "the transformation and upgrading" has important theoretical significance and practical significance.Based on control rights theory,agency theory,social network theory and information asymmetry theory,this paper constructs an overall analysis framework of non-controlling maj or shareholders’ participation in governance and stock price information content from the perspective of exit threat and interlocking shareholding.This paper discusses the mechanism and transmission path of the influence of non-controlling major shareholders’ participation in governance on the information content of stock price of listed companies,and the moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and economic policy uncertainty on the relationship between them.Using panel data from Shanghai,deep a-share listed companies in China,to build an empirical model,to the non-controlling large shareholders to participate in the management of stock price information content directly influences the effect of the specific mechanism of action and path as well as the controlling shareholder equity pledge,the uncertain economic policy has carried on the empirical test,mainly draws the following conclusions:①From the perspective of "exit threat",the participation of non controlling maj or shareholders in governance is based on the theory of corporate control rights,while the social network theory provides theoretical support for the participation of non controlling major shareholders in governance from the perspective of "chain shareholding".②The participation of non controlling maj or shareholders in governance can significantly enhance the information content of listed companies’ stock prices.Specifically,there is a significant positive causal relationship between the withdrawal threat of non controlling major shareholders and the information content of stock prices,while the chain shareholding of non controlling major shareholders can positively promote the information content of stock prices in listed companies.③In terms of the mechanism of action,non controlling major shareholders with a "credible"exit threat mainly have an impact on the information content of listed companies’ stock prices through the mechanism of influencing the wealth of controlling shareholders.From the perspective of chain shareholding,the mechanism of the impact of non controlling major shareholders on the information content of listed company stock prices mainly relies on the"information effect" of the ownership connection network formed by the same industry shareholding.The test results of the impact path indicate that non controlling major shareholders with a "credible" exit threat can effectively reduce the inertia disclosure behavior of corporate information by exerting a "supervisory effect",ultimately leading to a significant increase in the information content of listed companies’ stock prices.Non controlling major shareholders with chain shareholding can play the role of an "information bridge",achieving information sharing among enterprises within the same industry within the investment portfolio,effectively alleviating the degree of information asymmetry among enterprises and enhancing the stock price information content of listed companies.④The equity pledge of controlling shareholders and the uncertainty of economic policies can play a moderating role in the relationship between the participation of non controlling maj or shareholders in governance and the information content of stock prices.The equity pledge of controlling shareholders can play a positive promoting role in the relationship between the threat of non controlling major shareholders’ exit and the information content of stock prices,while economic policy uncertainty plays a negative moderating role.The possible innovations and theoretical contributions of this paper are reflected in the following aspects:Firstly,this paper takes non-controlling major shareholders as the research object to explore the impact of their participation in corporate governance on the stock price information content of listed companies,which enriches the relevant research on the influencing factors of stock price information content to a certain extent.As a logical starting point of corporate governance,it is particularly necessary to explore the influencing factors of stock price information content from the perspective of ownership structure.Based on the perspective of exit threat and interlocking shareholding,this paper concludes that the participation of non-controlling major shareholders in corporate governance can effectively improve the stock price information content of listed companies,which not only provides further evidence support for the view that improving corporate governance can improve the stock price information content,but also enriches the relevant research results on the influencing factors of stock price information content to a certain extent.Second,from the perspective of exit threat and interlocking shareholding,this paper analyzes the effect of non-controlling large shareholders’ participation in governance on stock price information content,which not only enriches the relevant research results on the governance effect of large shareholders,but also provides new evidence for the "information view" that interlocking shareholders influence corporate behavior.From the perspective of exit threat,it is found that with the credible launch threat,the participation of non-controlling maj or shareholders in corporate governance can show a good governance effect in improving the stock price information content of listed companies,which not only extends the view of shareholder activism of Chicago School,but also expands the related research in the field of maj or shareholder governance.③In terms of discussing the economic consequences caused by the withdrawal threat of major shareholders based on the Chinese scenario,most previous studies focus on the corporate level.This paper transfers the research perspective from the enterprise to the capital market,and finds that by relying on their "credible" exit threat,non-controlling major shareholders can effectively inhibit the information manipulation behavior of the enterprise,improve the information environment of the enterprise,and thus play a positive role in promoting the information content of the stock price of listed companies,which further enriches the relevant research results on the governance effect of major shareholders.There are discussions on the economic consequences of interlocking shareholders at this stage,but no consensus has been reached,and theoretical views such as collusion view,governance view and information view have been developed.The conclusion of this paper shows that non-controlling large shareholders can play a positive role in promoting the stock price information content of listed companies by the "information effect" formed by interlocking shareholding.The research conclusion not only enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of interlocking shareholders,but also provides new evidence for the "information view" that interlocking shareholders affect corporate behavior.Thirdly,exploring the mechanism of the influence of non-controlling shareholders’participation in governance on stock price information content is helpful to deepen the research on the relationship between governance structure and corporate economic consequences,and provide more operable suggestions for further improving corporate governance structure.The conclusion of this paper not only answers whether the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance affects the stock price information content of listed companies;Moreover,it further clarifies the different effects and influence paths of non-controlling majority shareholders’ participation in governance affecting stock price information content from the perspectives of exit threat and interlocking shareholding,which helps to further clarify and reveal the heterogeneity of action mechanism and the difference of internal influence mechanism of non-controlling majority shareholders’ participation in governance affecting corporate behavior.Thus,it can provide more operational guiding suggestions for further improving the corporate governance structure.Fourthly,this paper discusses the moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and economic environment uncertainty on the relationship between non-controlling maj ority shareholders’ participation in governance and stock price information content of listed companies,which is a further deepening of the internal mechanism of non-controlling maj ority shareholders’ participation in governance affecting stock price information content of listed companies.This paper is based on the realistic basis of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and economic policy uncertainty,and incorporates the above two levels of factors into the theoretical analysis framework of the influence of non-controlling shareholders’ participation in governance on the stock price information content of listed companies.We find that the equity pledge of controlling shareholders can play a positive role in regulating the relationship between the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders and the stock price information content.Economic policy uncertainty plays a role of negatively regulating the relationship between non-controlling major shareholder interlock and stock price information content,which provides new enlightenment for enterprises to better carry out corporate governance practices under different boundary conditions.